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ABSTRACT 
Networking technology has created huge infrastructures of highly integrated systems 
enabling access to sophisticated computing resources. This has, however, made these systems 
vulnerable to attacks by intruders who have the potential to cause them serious harm. In order 
to counter this threat, significant research effort has been directed towards developing 
intrusion detection systems that offer the capability to detect intruders in real time. 
Intrusion detection systems employ various techniques for detection. Most common 
are misuse detection that depends on the ability to recognize known attack signatures to 
detect attacks, and anomaly detection that performs detection by comparing current system 
activity with models of normal use . Consequently, anomaly detection can detect previously 
unknown attacks also. However, owing to approximations in defining normal behavior, their 
false alarm rate is high as compared to misuse detection which is fairly accurate. This 
implies that misuse detection is an essential component for successful intrusion detection. 
In this thesis, we employ signature-based analysis for detection of two major and 
timely categories of attacks carried out against networked systems; distributed denial of 
service attacks and buffer overflow attacks. Attack signatures are developed and coded into a 
commercial intrusion detection system, Network Flight Recorder (NFR). NFR has provision 
to code attack signatures using an interpreted language, called N-code. We develop rule sets 
(filters) in N-code and discuss their implementation. These filters can extract header 
information from various protocols as well as retrieve packet payload contents. This 
information is then matched using signature analysis to determine intrusion scenarios. 
We simulate the distributed denial of service and buffer overflow attacks, develop 
attack signatures and implement NFR filters to show real-time detection of these attacks 
using NFR IDS. In this way we extend the functionality of NFR as an intrusion detection 
system (IDS) as a step towards providing greater measure of security to systems connected to 
the Internet. 
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CHAPTER! INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Network Security Issues 
Advancements in computer networking technology have resulted m huge 
infrastructures of highly integrated computer systems that provide ready access to 
sophisticated computing resources. These integrated computer systems are playing a key 
role in managing the ever growing needs in fields of communication, commerce, education, 
entertainment and defense, along with host of other applications. However, as with every 
new technology, the interoperability and sophisticated integration of these computer systems 
has also brought new vulnerabilities that have rendered them prone to a variety of threats. 
These weaknesses can be exploited to cause release of confidential information, or allow the 
theft of computational resources or sabotage of critical data. The result may be limited to the 
loss of private information or may be as serious as a threat to national security. 
There is, therefore, a growing need to make the networked computing systems secure 
and protect them against all kinds of threats . One such tool that can assist in achieving this 
aim is an Intrusion Detection System. 
1.2 Intrusion Detection 
An intrusion is said to occur when someone attempts to break into a system or to 
misuse the system resources. An intrusion, as defined by Heady et al [1] is, "Any set of 
actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or availability of a resource". 
And intrusion detection as defined by Amoroso [2] is, "Process of identifying and responding 
to malicious activity targeted at computing and networking resources". 
There are basically two types of intrusions, namely outside intrusions and inside 
intrusions. Outside intrusions occur when someone outside of the network attempts to gain 
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unauthorized access to the system while inside intrusions are the ones where a legitimate user 
inside the network tries to use the system resources for which he/she is not authorized. 
In order to provide a detection capability, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are 
utilized. An IDS is installed on a computer or network of computers to detect intrusions 
while they are taking place. An IDS is designed to monitor the system activity and to issue 
alerts when it detects sequences of events considered to be suspicious. An intrusion 
detection system can accomplish this in real-time, in near real time or after the fact, 
depending on the system architecture. Obviously, the goal is real-time intrusion detection. 
Intrusion detection has traditionally been divided into three categories: misuse 
detection, anomaly detection and the hybrid detection approach. Misuse detection pertains to 
intrusions that follow known attack patterns based on previous attacks carried out exploiting 
system weaknesses or flaws in application software or protocol design. It is also called as a 
signature based detection and involves determining rule sets for detecting known attack 
signatures. However, this technique can ensure detection only if the attack signatures are 
already known and is unable to detect new attacks that have never been implemented earlier. 
Anomaly detection employs building normal usage patterns for users and systems and 
attempts to detect intrusive activity by comparing current activity with the normal behavior. 
This technique has the advantage of being able to detect new attacks that have not been seen 
before as it does not depend on attack signatures for detection. However, determining 
normal behavior requires prior system training and approximating threshold values which 
adds to the level of uncertainty in detection. This results in a high false alarm rate. If 
threshold values are kept high, false alarm rate can be lowered, however, it may allow an 
intrusion to be passed as normal behavior. Moreover, repeated false alarms train system 
administrators to ignore IDS alarms and thus, needs to be minimized. 
The third approach, the Hybrid systems, combines the attributes of both the above 
systems complementing each other and improves performance by reducing false positives. 
1.3 Our Approach 
Our focus in this thesis is on detecting intrusions through a signature analysis. 
Signature based detection forms the first line of defense for any system against impending 
3 
attacks. As already mentioned, signature based analysis depends on knowledge about 
existing attacks. A careful analysis of existing attacks reveals signature patterns that can be 
used for coding rule sets. These rule sets when used in an IDS provide a basis for detection 
with high accuracy. This implies that using signature based technique, detection of known 
attacks can be carried out with a high degree of precision and it has the potential to provide a 
solid line of defense to systems connected to the Internet. 
Another reason for selecting signature based analysis is the fact that attacks get 
repeated in the Internet. The study of attacks exploiting any vulnerability indicates that an 
attack has a lifetime [3]. An attack comes into play when a vulnerability or a weakness is . 
observed in a system, protocol or an application. Means are developed to exploit the 
vulnerability and the attack is implemented. As an attack becomes popular through the 
sharing of information in the hacker community, incidents occur more frequently untill attack 
frequency reaches its peak value and then it starts decreasing. This happens when vendors 
come out with a countermeasure in the form of a patch to the system which removes the 
vulnerability. However, a study of attack frequencies available from [4] and [5], would also 
indicate that the same attacks get repeated after certain periods of time. This is surprising but 
it can be explained on the basis of the fact that the number of machines connected to the 
Internet is huge and is still growing to become astronomical. Only a small portion of the 
systems on the Internet get patched up for a vulnerability immediately. A large number of 
users remain unaware of the attacks and do not update their systems. Some may even come 
to know about the attacks but are too complacent to take remedial action, thinking that it will 
not happen to them. The result is that at any point in time, a large number of machines are 
having the vulnerability that should ideally have been removed and the attack gets 
implemented after periodic intervals. 
It is, therefore, essential as a first step towards successful intrusion detection that all 
known attacks be studied and their signatures be coded in the IDS for a signature based 
analysis. This may be followed by anomaly based detection as the second step. 
There are a large number of commercially available systems that have been 
developed for signature based intrusion detection. One such product is NFR, by Network 
Flight Recorder Inc. that has been chosen for our research. NFR was developed as a general 
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purpose network monitoring tool with the capability to capture and analyze network traffic 
and statistics. However, the system had a special feature in that the filtration process was 
programmable rather than being coded statically into the monitoring system. This was 
accomplished through the use of an interpreted language, N-code, developed for use with 
NFR. The N-code feature has allowed NFR to be used successfully for intrusion detection. 
N-code not only captures packet header information but can also extract data form within the 
packets for comparison. It can be used to write rule sets, called filters, to parse the incoming 
network traffic and carry out an analysis to detect known attacks patterns. 
1.4 The Contribution of Our Research 
In this thesis, we present an analysis of the two most commonly occurring attack 
types in the Internet community; distributed denial of service attacks and the buffer overflow 
attacks and develop NFR filters to detect these types of attacks. We use a distributed denial 
of service attack tool "mstream" and the buffer overflow attack against an SMTP 
implementation for our research. These attacks were choosen because they represent a major 
portion of the attacks being implemented against systems on the Internet. We show that 
these and similar attacks can be detected using NFR Intrusion Detection System. We 
develop filters for NFR by coding the analyzed attack signatures for the two types of attacks 
and then carry out an implementation. The actual attacks are replayed and the NFR IDS is 
shown to detect these attacks in real time. 
The implementation of these filters extend the NFR functionality as a signature based 
IDS. This is a step towards providing greater security to systems connected to the Internet 
and will allow Internet users to conduct their businesses in an environment of enhanced 
confidence. 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
The thesis organization is such that in Chapter 2 we give an introduction to Intrusion 
Detection Systems and discuss the various types and implementation techniques. Chapter 3 
provides an overview of NFR explaining the architecture and functionality. It also introduces 
N-code, the language to code attack signatures for filtration. 
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In Chapters 4 and 5, we analyze the two attack types and develop NFR filter for their 
detection. In Chapter 4 we give an introduction to distributed denial of service attacks and 
carry out an analysis of a DDOS attack tool "mstream". We also develop an NFR filter for 
detection of "mstream" attack and explain the algorithm for coding this filter. Following the 
same steps, in Chapter 5 we carry out a study of buffer overflow attacks and then show how 
NFR filter for detecting this type of attack against an SMTP implementation is developed. 
Finally, Chapter 6 contains the filter tests and concluding results. 
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CHAPTER2 INTRUSION DETECTION 
2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion detection systems are developed to provide the capability of detecting 
intrusions in real-time. They inherently base their operations upon analysis of data collected 
through various sources. The data may come from the operating system audit trails, which 
forms a footprint of system usage over time. Observations based on this data allows an IDS 
to compute metrics about the overall system state and determine if an intrusion is currently 
occurring. An IDS may also perform its own system monitoring and build a system usage · 
profile. This profile can be derived from a variety of sources such as CPU usage, disk I/0, 
memory usage or other user activities and may describe a set of intrusion scenarios or the 
profile of a clean system. When correlated with an internal model representing normal 
usage, it allows the IDS to determine if a series of actions constitute a potential intrusion. 
Typically, the collected data is processed for signatures of known attacks, anomalous 
behavior or specific outcomes of interest. Intrusion detection is largely dependent upon the 
ability to access and analyze audit data of sufficient quality and quantity and may be 
accomplished after the fact, in near real-time with some human intervention or in real-time 
with support of automated countermeasures. 
2.2 Types of Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion detection systems can generally be categorized based on the model of 
detection employed or on their data sources [6]: 
(a) Characterization based on model of intrusion: 
Misuse Detection System 
Anomaly Detection System 
Hybrid Detection System 
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(b) Characterization based on data sources: 
Host Based IDS 
Network Based IDS 
2.3 IDS Based on Models of Intrusion Detection 
Based on the model of detection employed, IDS can be any of the following types: 
2.3.1 Misuse Detection System 
Misuse detection systems, or knowledge based systems, apply knowledge 
accumulated about specific attacks and system vulnerabilities to detect intrusions. The 
intrusion detection system contains information about known vulnerabilities and looks for 
attempts to exploit them. For example, case like a normal user becoming a superuser and 
attempting to access protected information. When such an attempt is detected, an alarm is 
triggered. Any action that is not explicitly recognized as an attack is considered acceptable. 
Therefore, the accuracy of knowledge-based intrusion detection systems is considered good. 
However, their ability to detect all possible attacks depends on the regular update of the 
knowledge database. 
Misuse detection systems check for activity known to be bad with comparison to 
abstracted descriptions of undesired activity. This approach attempts to draft rules describing 
known undesired usage or activity which is theorized would exploit known weaknesses. The 
effectiveness of the misuse detection rules is, therefore, dependent upon how current the 
developers are about the system vulnerabilities. 
Misuse detection systems can be implemented in the following ways: 
Expert Systems: Expert systems may be used to code misuse signatures as if-then 
implication rules. Signatures describe an attribute of an attack and may involve recognition 
of a sequence of events. This provides a capability to quickly adapt the system to detect 
newly identified attacks prior to overcoming the vulnerability on the target system. 
However, misuse rules tend to be specific to the target machine and thus not very portable. 
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Model Based Reasoning: This technique combines models of misuse with 
evidential reasoning to support conclusions about the occurrence of a misuse. This technique 
models intrusions at a high, intuitive level of abstraction in terms of sequences of events that 
define the intrusion. It may be useful for identifying intrusions which are closely related but 
whose audit trail patterns are different. 
State Transition Analysis: This technique utilizes a state transition model of 
known penetrations. Initially, the system is in a particular state, which as a result of intruder 
activities may pass through intermediate states and eventually result in a compromised state. 
Evidence is preselected from the audit trail to assess the possibility that current system 
activity matches a modeled sequence of intruder penetration activity. The higher level 
representation of intrusions allows this technique to recognize variations of scenario missed 
by lower level approaches. 
Neural Networks: Neural networks offer an alternative means of maintaining a 
model of expected normal user behavior. However, they require a lengthy and careful 
training phase with skilled monitoring. The neural network techniques are still in research 
stage and may ultimately be found to be more efficient and less computationally intensive 
than conventional rule based systems. 
The advantages of the knowledge-based approaches are that they have the potential 
for very low false alarm rates. However, they have drawbacks also. The maintenance of 
knowledge base requires careful analysis of vulnerabilities and is required to be kept updated. 
Moreover, the knowledge about attacks is dependent on the type of operating system, 
version, platform and application, making the IDS quite system dependent. Also, detection 
of insider attacks involving abuse of privileges is deemed more difficult with this technique 
as no vulnerability is actually exploited by the attacker. 
2.3.2 Anomaly Detection System 
Anomaly detection systems, also called as behavior based systems assume that 
intrusions can be detected by observing a deviation from normal or expected behavior. The 
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model of normal or expected behavior is extracted from reference information collected by 
various means. The intrusion detection system later compares this model with the current 
activity and detects deviations, if any. Anything that does not correspond to a previously 
learned behavior is considered intrusive. Therefore, the intrusion detection system might be 
able to detect all attacks but is not very accurate and has the tendency to produce a large 
number of false alarms. 
Anomaly detection systems can be implemented in the following ways: 
Threshold Monitoring: This technique involves setting threshold values for 
metrics to define acceptable behavior. However, it is often difficult to characterize normal or 
intrusive behavior solely in terms of thresholds corresponding to available audit records and 
requires approximations. This results in the system having a high rate of false positives or 
false negatives across a non-uniform user population. 
User Work Profiling: It maintains user work profiles corresponding to each 
individual. Users are expected to adhere to this profile in future. As the user changes his 
activities his expected work profile gets updated. Some systems also attempt to distinguish 
short term from long term profiles to capture recent or long term changing work patterns. 
However, profiling irregular and dynamic user base is difficult and too broadly defined 
profiles may allow intrusive activity to pass review. 
Group Work Profiling: Users having common profiles are assigned to specific 
work groups and a group profile is identified. All users in group are expected to adhere to 
the group profile. This method not only reduces the number of profiles needed to be 
maintained but also limits chances of profile "broadening" due to a single non-conforming 
user. However, being able to select appropriate groups is an area of concern. Moreover, 
individual users who do not cleanly fit into the defined group profiles pose complications. 
Resource Profiling: This technique monitors use of resources such as accounts, 
applications, storage media, protocols, communications ports etc. and develops system wide 
10 
historic usage profile. Continued system-wide resource usage, which represents the user 
community's use of system resources as a whole, is expected to adhere to the system 
resource profile. However, it may be difficult to interpret the meaning of changes in overall 
system usage. Resource profiling is user independent, potentially allowing detection of 
collaborating intruders. 
Executable Profiling: It monitors the use of system resources by executables, 
especially those whose activity cannot always be traced to a particular originating user. 
Viruses, trojan horses, worms, trap doors, logic bombs and other such software attacks are 
addressed by profiling how system objects such as files and printers are normally used. A 
virus inherits all of the privileges of the user executing the infected software. The software is 
generally not limited by the principle of least privilege to only those needed to execute 
properly. This openness in the architecture permits viruses to surreptitiously change and 
infect totally unrelated parts of the system. User independent executable profiling may also 
be able to detect collaborating intruders. 
Static Work Profiling: This technique involves updating usage profiles as and 
when required by administrator. This prevents users from slowly broadening their profile by 
phasing in abnormal or deviant activities which are then considered normal and included in 
user's adaptive profile calculation. This administrator controlled update allows comparison 
of discrete user profiles to note differences between user behavior or changes in user 
behavior. However, these profiles must either be wide and insensitive or frequently updated. 
Otherwise if user work patters change significantly, many false positives will result. This 
approach also requires diligence on the part of administrator who must update profiles in 
response to false positives and ensure changes represent legitimate work habit changes. 
Adaptive Work Profiling: It involves continuously updating work profiles to reflect 
current system activity. Profiling may be on user, group or application level. Adaptive work 
profiling may allow the administrator to specify whether flagged activity is intrusive to be 
acted upon, not intrusive and appropriate as a profile update to reflect this new work pattern 
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or intrusive, but to be ignored as an aberration whose next occurrence will again be of 
interest. Activity that is not flagged as intrusive gets automatically fed into a profile updating 
mechanism. If this mechanism is automated, the administrator will not be bothered, 
however, work profiles may change and continue to change without the administrator' s 
knowledge or approval. 
Adaptive Rule Based Profiling: This technique differs from other profiling 
techniques by capturing the historical usage patterns of a user, group or application in the 
form of rules. Transactions describing current behavior are checked against the set of 
developed rules and changes from rule predicted behavior are flagged. As opposed to misuse 
rule based systems, no prior expert knowledge of security vulnerabilities of the monitored 
system is required. "Normal usage" rules are generated by the tool in its training period. 
However, training may be sluggish compared to straight profiling methods. Also, to be 
effective, a vast number of rules must be maintained with inherent performance issues. 
Management of tools adopting this technique requires extensive training, especially if site-
specific rules are to be developed. 
2.3.3 Hybrid Detection System 
A hybrid detection system is the one that utilizes the complementary combination of 
the misuse and anomaly detection techniques. It combines the advantages to be gained from 
each technique, thus enhancing performance and reducing the false alarm rate. 
2.4 IDS Based on Data Sources 
Based on data sources, intrusion detection systems can be of the following types: 
2.4.1 Host Based IDS 
In a host based IDS, the ID software is loaded on the system which is to be 
monitored. This software utilizes the system log files and other audit agents as sources of 
data. The intrusion detection involves monitoring the traffic in and out of the host computer, 
checking the integrity of the system files and watching for any suspicious process. The two 
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primary classes of host based intrusion detection software are the host wrappers/ personal 
firewalls and agent based software. 
The host wrappers or personal firewalls can be configured to look at all network 
packets, connection attempts or login attempts to the monitored machine. This can also 
include dial-in attempts or other non-network related communication ports. Personal 
firewalls can also detect software on the host attempting to connect to the network. Host 
based agents may be able to monitor accesses and changes to critical system files and 
changes in user privileges. 
There is a rich set of software tools to perform host based intrusion detection. No one 
package will do everything and the software should be tailored to the individual computer 
being monitored. If a machine has a handful of users, perhaps only the connections from the 
outside in addition to the integrity of the system files need to be monitored. Whereas a 
machine with a lot of users or network traffic may need more stringent monitoring. Host 
based intrusion detection is only as good as the logging that is done. Programs can be written 
to analyze log files and alert the system administrator via e-mail or pager when something is 
amiss. System logging information can be sent to a remote site or modified, so that the log 
files are put into non-standard places to prevent hackers from covering their tracks. 
2.4.2 Network Based IDS 
A network based ID system monitors the traffic on its network segment. This is 
generally accomplished by placing the network interface card in promiscuous mode to 
capture all network traffic that crosses its network segment. Traffic using other segments or 
other means of communication, like phone lines, cannot be monitored. 
Network based IDS involves a sensor, which looks at the packets on the network. 
The sensor can only see the packets that happen to be carried on the network segment it is 
attached to. Packets are considered to be of interest if they match a signature. Three primary 
types of signatures are string signatures, port signatures and the header condition signatures. 
String signatures look for a text string in packet payload that indicates a possible 
attack. An example string signature for Unix might be "cat "+ +" /.rhosts" , which if 
successful might cause a Unix system to become extremely vulnerable to a network attack. 
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To refine the string signature to reduce the number of false positives, it may be necessary to 
use a compound string signature. A compound string signature for a common web server 
attack might be "cgi-bin" AND "aglimpse" AND "IFS". 
Port signatures simply watch for connection attempts to well known, frequently 
attacked ports. Examples of these ports include telnet (TCP port 23), FTP (TCP port 21/20), 
SUNRPC (TCP/UDP port 111) and IMAP (TCP port 143). If any of these ports are not used 
by the site then incoming packets to these sites are suspicious. 
Header signatures watch for dangerous or illogical combinations in packet headers. 
The most famous example is an attack program called Winnuke, where a packet is destined 
for a NetBIOS port and the urgent pointer or out of band pointer is set. This results in the 
"blue screen of death" for windows system. Another well known header signature is a TCP 
packet with both SYN and FIN flags set, indicating that the requester wishes to start and stop 
the connection at the same time, resulting in a denial of service. 
14 
CHAPTER3 NETWORK FLIGHT RECORDER (NFR) 
3.1 NFR Introduction 
In order to protect and track network activity several tools have been designed and 
implemented from time to time. In fact, this development has evolved through different 
phases. The first phase was security tools such as firewalls. While firewalls do restrict access 
to and from networks, hackers could still break through a firewall and gain unauthorized 
access. Then in early 1990s, came security tools that could be used to log who was accessing 
your network as well as see what was happening in the system. It was even possible to send 
alerts to network managers if something unusual occurred. Finally, intrusion detection 
systems evolved, as we see them today, focusing on features of the host computer or the 
network and carrying out detection based on signature analysis, anomaly detection or the 
hybrid approach. One such system that utilizes signature based approach, is the Network 
Flight Recorder, or NFR. 
NFR [7] was basically developed as a network monitoring tool that could capture and 
analyze network traffic and statistics. However, NFR had the unique characteristic that the 
filtering and analysis process was internally programmable, rather than being static-coded 
into the monitoring application. This capability allowed it to be used for detection of known 
intrusion patterns thru development of filters in its own language which is called as the N-
code. 
NFR does not interfere with network activity. Instead, it merely captures or copies 
information and stores it on disk. This info can later be accessed thru a GUI for further 
analysis. NFR is also capable of generating alerts whenever an event of interest occurs on 
the network. It is not only a practical IDS, but also provides a valuable data source for 
researchers working on intrusion detection. 
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3.2 NFR Architecture 
NFR architecture is depicted in Figure 3.1. It mainly has the following components: 
(a) Packet Sniffers. 
(b) The Engine. 
(c) Backend Processors. 
(d) Query System. 
(e) Alert System. 
(f) Space Management System. 
(g) Graphical User Interface. 
recorder 
/ 
,✓--
/ 
recorder 
-~---' 
alertd 
. Lre.c order ! . -----
i / \" \ 
alt.ttd. rJclivi::•}/ i \ ·\, 
l i \ \ 
pager fax \ \ 
·•\. I, 1 email 
. \ ' \ ~ 't 
'\__ \ etc \\., 
\_ \ ' 
\ .. , \ \ \ 
\\ \_ f, ) 
el/erything in the box is the b ac kerid 
date. d0.ta 
--
data file rl· query processor _:.:._. t~-•- USER 
I 
' 
elfery,,:hing in th r box is the backerid 
f 
data deX<:!. I 
--
/ 
/ i 
I I j i 
/ ,f. i 
/ ; 
i 
I 
, 
data f ~e query processor / 
• ! I ( 
el/~1 .• .:..c :.. th , box is the backerid / } 
f 
data. data i 
dat~ f le / 
' 
query processor ' 
. ,: 
! J )1 
,,. ............ _1-;::::-~·., 
// spaceman -;::. 
/ 
; 
' I 
I , 
I 
\ \\ I. ", , // 
~~--------------------~ 
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NFR begins its processing when it receives a packet from the network. The packets 
are forwarded to a central process called the "Engine", which interprets the filters. Filters are 
written in N-Code and represent signature patterns required to be detected. The filters are 
read into the engine, compiled, and preserved as byte-code instructions for fast execution. 
All packets are evaluated against these filters to determine which ones resemble attack 
patterns, if any. Based upon the filtering logic, if some information is flagged as pertinent, it 
is recorded to a backend for storage or statistical processing. The backends store this data on 
disks. After the data has been stored, it can be queried through the query backend or the GUI. 
Also, based on the filtering decision, the NFR can send an "alert" to the system administrator 
if an event of interest takes place. Since data is stored on disk, it consumes space, which can 
become very large with time and traffic increase. Therefore, the disk usage is monitored and 
controlled by a system called Space Management system or "spacemand". "Spacemand" can 
archive or delete the data to keep a backend within a particular disk quota. 
The components of NFR are discussed as follows: 
Packet Sniffers: A packet sniffer is used to copy all network packets to the local 
system. NFR packet sniffers are based on Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) and the well known 
libpcap, packet capture interface. This forms a generalized interface that can run on a 
number of operating systems and hence makes NFR portable. Moreover, the packet passing 
through a generalized API enables packet sniffers to be independent processes from the 
engine and allows multiple packet sniffers to be used with the same engine. Packets from 
libpcap also have the time field that gives a notion of time to entire engine. 
NFR Engine: NFR engine performs several functions. First it reassembles the 
TCP stream keeping track of the current TCP session. This allows matching patterns or other 
events in each session. Secondly, it applies received packets against a list of filters. Filters 
are written in N-code and allow programmatic access to fields within the packets for 
purposes of recording info from or about the fields. After a packet has been applied against 
the filters, it is discarded. The main primitives for getting information out of the packets are 
Record and Alert mechanisms. The record mechanism passes a constructed data structure to 
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a backend for further processing. Using the structured record allows the engine and backend 
to preagree upon the format of information to be received, thus permitting faster processing. 
The alert passes a free form message to alert management system, much like a call to 
syslog() in Unix. 
Backend Processors: Backend processors control the type of data to be recorded 
and also indicate the format in which this data will be recorded. There is a backend for each 
type of data that is required to be captured. Each backend has three components, the filter, 
the configuration file, and the recorder. A filter is a rule set written in N-Code which 
specifies the event that should be considered as suspicious and should cause an alert to be 
generated or data to be captured from the incoming packets and recorded. A filter is the 
component that acts as a trigger and causes NFR to begin gathering data when an event of 
interest takes place. Second is the configuration file , which specifies the format in which 
data is to be recorded. And lastly, the recorder writes information gathered from packets to 
files. 
NFR includes two different recorders. The List recorder records information about 
each event and maintains chronological records. The Histogram recorder maintains statistical 
records, i.e. totals the discrete values in columns or increments them. Histogram recorder is 
more space efficient than List recorder while the List recorder can store greater details about 
an event. 
Query System: After the backend has recorded data to disk, it can be queried 
through the NFR Query System. A query, by default, accesses all data stored for a backend. 
However, the amount of data being accessed can be limited to a certain time period or by 
source or destination IP addresses. The results of query can be viewed as Text, an HTML-
formatted table or a comma separated value (CSV) file. If the backend being queried uses 
histogram recorder, results can also be seen in graphical format as a Bar graph, Pie chart or 
Scatter plot. Query interface is a separate function that does not interfere with the recording 
of data. It, therefore, produces minimum impact on performance if multiple users query the 
system during operation. 
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Alert System: An alert is a message sent to a user when some exceptional or 
noteworthy condition occurs. The NFR generates an alert based on filtering decision by the 
NFR engine. The alerts can also originate in some parts of NFR that detect an error 
condition. While originating an alert, a message is sent to a process called "alertd". "Alertd" 
accepts alert messages from various NFR processes and acts as a queuing and forwarding 
system. It can send alerts to users in various formats e.g. the messages might be logged or 
sent as a fax, page or e-mail. Moreover, alerts being logged can also be marked as requiring 
acknowledgment by system administrators, thus ensuring action on their behalf. 
Space Management System: Data from the backend processors is stored on disks. 
With time and increased traffic, the disk space used can become excessive. It is therefore, 
required that the disk usage be monitored and controlled. This function is performed by the 
NFR Space Management system called "spacemand". Using this system, each backend can 
be allocated a disk quota. The life of data to be stored for each backend can also be 
specified. The "spacemand" can then either archive or delete the data to keep a backend 
within its disk quota. Space manager can expire data based on retention criteria specified by 
user and can take either of the following actions: 
(a) Remove data that exceeds a size or time threshold. 
(b) Copy data to another disk. 
( c) Send data to be processed by an external application. 
( d) Tum off expiration of data for a backend. 
On startup, "spacemand" reads space management configuration file and builds a 
table of archived database areas to manage. It then scans the databases for files that need to 
be removed. When a backend creates and closes a new file, it sends a message to 
"spacemand". "Spacemand" checks to see if the file has pushed things over the configured 
thresholds and takes appropriate action. The functionality of spacemand allows it to be 
responsive even during times of high traffic. 
19 
Graphical User Interface: The Graphical User Interface (GUI) provides a secure 
remote management capability for the NFR. The GUI is written in Java and is accessed 
through a Web browser. GUI is the main tool for configuring and querying NFR. Each 
backend has a number of GUI elements, each controlling its individual configuration 
attributes and the query interface. GUI allows to view the following: 
(a) Current network status. 
(b) Statistical history. 
(c) Alert logs. 
3.3 NFR Programming Language 
The NFR programming language called N-code is an interpreted language, which is 
meant to write the rule sets, called filters, for processing data received from the network 
interfaces. N-code is a general purpose language with typed variables, iteration constructs 
and procedures. The language is parsed by the continuously running engine, which makes 
the packet stream available to NFR code. The NFR engine sifts through network traffic 
sending over interesting data to the recorders. Although the primary function of engine is to 
move data to the recorders, NFR code can perform substantial processing on the packet data 
before it is handed over to the recorders. As the packet moves through the network stacks 
through the engine, triggers are tested. If any trigger matches, the associated NFR filter or 
function is interpreted. The NFR engine interprets instructions generated by parsing the NFR 
code. 
3.4 Features of N-code 
The N-code has the following features: 
Lexical Elements: The following characters and elements are used in N-code. 
Character set Alphabetic, Numeric, Graphic. 
Operators + - * I % = & I - 11. 1 > < >> << && II 
!= >= <= inside 
Variables Alphabetic, Numeric, Graphic. 
Reserved Words 
Constants 
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Local variables created by using $ character as prefix to variable name. 
Special local variables created by using $# for parameter passing to a 
function. 
break, call, continue, declare, else, filter, foreach, func, to, global, if, 
inside, NULL, off, on, record, return, while. 
Integer constants 
String constants 
decimal, hexadecimal. 
double/single quotes, escape character. 
Data Types: The data types supported in N-code are: 
"array", "error", "ethmac", "int", "1Pv4host", "Ipv4net", "list", "pattern", "recorder" 
and "str". 
Expressions: The various expressions used in N-code are: 
"Arithmetic", "Assignment", "Bitwise", "Logical" and "Relational" expressions. 
Statements : The types of statements defined in N-code are: 
"assignment", "block", "break", "declare", "expression", "foreach", "if', "on", "off', 
"record", "requires", "return" and "while" statements. 
Functions: The various functions defined in N-code are: 
"alert", "atoi", "blobbytes", "bytes", "cat", "display", "echo", "elem", "errno", 
"ethmac", "formatted time", "host", "index", "listadd", "listlen", "long", "lsort", "luniq", 
"net", "recorder", "regcomp", "regexec", "scope", "short", "split", "strcasecmp", "strerror", 
"strlen", "strtype", "sublist", "substr", "typeof', "ubyte", "ulong" and "ushort". 
Packet Variables : N-code defines various packet variables to grab the information 
from within the protocol headers for implementing the rule sets. They are: 
Ethernet eth.803, eth.blob, eth.dst, eth.len, eth.src, eth.type. 
ICMP icmp.blob, icmp.cksum, icmp.code, icmp.hdr, icmp.is, icmp.type. 
IP ip.blob, ip.dest, ip.dst, ip.is, ip.len, ip.lnerror, ip.proto, ip.protocol, 
Packet 
System 
TCP 
21 
. . Ip.source, 1p.src. 
packet.blob, packet.len, packet.nonce, packet.sec, packet.usec. 
system.time. 
tcp.is, tcp.hdr, tcp.length, tcp.blob, tcp.sourceport, tcp.destport, 
tcp.conn, tcp.connSym, tcp.connDst, tcp.connSport, tcp.connDport, 
tcp.connSyn, tcp.connFinn, tcp.connRst, tcp.connForwBytes, 
tcp.connBackBytes, tcp.connForwLost, tcp.connBackLost, 
tcp.connHash, tcp.connEpoch, tcp.connMap, tcp.connPktSec, 
tcp.connSave, tcp.connSynAck, , tcp.stream. 
UDP udp.blob, udp.destport, udp.dport, udp.hdr, udp.is, udp.len, 
udp.sourceport, udp.sport. 
3.5 Advantages of NFR Filter Coding 
NFR was not originally designed as an IDS, however, its general purpose scripting 
language allowed it to be used as a signature based network Intrusion Detection System. 
This was accomplished through building signature recognition routines in N-code. As is 
obvious, having control over coding attack signature is very useful from user aspect. Users 
can rely upon consulting services for provision of signatures for well known attacks. As 
soon as a new attack is discovered, a filter can be developed for its detection. This is 
particularly advantageous in present day scenario, where new attacks are emerging all the 
time. NFR filter coding can then provide an efficient detection technique for such attacks 
untill application developers release a patch to remove the vulnerability in the system 
concerned. Moreover, users can also develop custom signatures for their particular 
applications. 
A particularly advantageous factor in this filter coding technique is that it can detect 
attacks very efficiently involving significantly less false positives as compared to other 
prevalent techniques for intrusion detection. Moreover, it can serve as a very effective 
component in an intrusion detection system in combination with an anomaly detection 
scheme. The anomaly detection can be employed to detect new attacks that have no known 
signatures, while the signature based detection using NFR filters can be used against known 
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attacks whose signatures can be coded into filters. The overall result would be an efficient 
system which is not expected to generate a significant number of false alarms. 
CHAPTER4 
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NFR FILTER FOR DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF 
SERVICE EXPLOITS 
4.1 Network Denial of Service 
Denial of service can be defined as preventing legitimate users from use of a service 
by employing techniques to render the service unavailable; and by network denial of service 
we mean denying the use of network resources to authorized users. Network denial of 
service is generally carried out by flooding the network with an immense amount of traffic, 
preventing flow of legitimate traffic and thus causing disruption of connection and 
unavailability of the resources. 
Denial of service (DOS) attacks are becoming common in the Internet community 
these days. This is attributed to ready availability of attack codes and ease of 
implementation. Code development for this type of an attack is indeed not a task for an 
average hacker. However, once an expert has written the code, it is fairly easy to be 
downloaded and used by an amateur hacker. This, coupled with the fact that DOS attacks 
like SYN flood, Smurf, Teardrop etc. are capable of producing immediate noticeable results, 
they have been used effectively in bringing down machines and services on the Internet. 
4.2 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDOS) 
As DOS attacks started to mature, there came a variant that multiplied the attacking 
capability by utilizing combined power of multitudes of systems to conduct an attack on a 
single target. These attacks became known as the "Distributed Denial of Service" (DDOS) 
attacks. Their implementation is based on distributed technology. A distributed system is an 
interconnection of more than one computer system, e.g. a network of computers. A 
distributed attack, therefore, refers to the use of a distributed system for purposes of attack 
and hence the name DDOS attack. Using this technique employing hundreds of machines, 
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effects of packet flooding are compounded to an extent sufficient to bring down even high 
capacity networks as experienced in recent past with attacks on Yahoo and other Internet 
business sites. 
4.2.1 Attack Components 
A typical system employing distributed denial of service attack, as described in [8] , 
consists of an "Intruder", a small number of "Masters", a large number of "Agents" and a 
"Target". Pictorially it can be represented as shown in Figure 4.1. The function of each 
component is explained as under: 
Intruder: Intruder is a host that runs client program to control a number of 
"Masters". 
"Target" . 
It hosts the attacker who initiates attack on a victim machine, which is the 
Control Traffic 
Attack Traffic 
Figure 4.1: Distributed Denial of Service Attack 
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Masters: Masters are hosts controlled by intruder. They in turn control a large 
number of "Agents". Masters run an application to receive commands from intruder and 
generate appropriate responses. Among other responses is to instruct agents to launch an 
attack against the target machine specified by intruder. 
Agents: Agents are hosts runnmg processes (daemons) receiving commands 
from masters and launching packet flood attacks against specified "Targets". 
4.2.2 Attack Mechanism 
In order to carry out a DDOS attack, the first step involves installation of masters and 
daemons on compromised sites. Installation process is based on the ability to exploit well-
known vulnerabilities existing in hosts connected to the Internet. The process could be 
manual but evidence supports that discovery and comprome of vulnerable machines, 
installation of attack codes and concealment of intrusion traces are totally automated, 
resulting in code installation on hundreds of machines within a short span of time. 
An intruder connects to master using TCP connection. Password authentication is 
employed to ensure that master receives commands only from authorized intruder. There is 
an exchange of pre-defined commands between intruder and masters which varies with 
implementation; the most common being to set single or multiple target IP addresses, set 
duration of attack, start/stop the attack, ping the agents to see if they are alive or shut 
down/log off the master. Upon receipt of commands, masters consult their database for 
active daemons and initiate similar commands for them. The commands can be sent using 
TCP, UDP, ICMP or all three protocols at random. The communication can be in plaintext 
or encrypted using some standard encryption technique. 
When installed, the daemon sends an initial message to all pre-programmed masters. 
Message is usually sent using UDP and serves to indicate presence of the agent concerned in 
reception mode. When agent receives command from master to launch an attack against 
specified target/targets, it can initiate a variety of packet flooding attacks like TCP/Syn, 
UDP, ICMP/Ping, Broadcast/Ping, TCP/Ack etc. The daemon could also randomly alternate 
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between any/all of these attacks depending on implementation or version of the attack tool. 
Additionally, attack packets originating from daemons usually have spoofed source IP 
addresses. The attack continues for the duration specified by intruder. 
4.2.3 Effects of DDOS Attack 
Distributed denial of service attacks are aimed at disrupting services offered by 
networked resources. As described in [9], currently available DDOS tools achieve in 
following ways. 
Bandwidth Consumption: Denial of service occurs when an attacker is able to 
generate such huge amount of network traffic, which consumes all available bandwidth. 
Result is to deny use of network to legitimate traffic. Although this effect is achieved rather 
easily in small networks, large, high capacity networks are not totally immune to this attack. 
The combined firepower of several hundred machines used in an attack can potentially take 
down a very high capacity network. The directed packets are usually ICMP echo reply 
packets but could belong to any other protocol also. 
Consumption of Resources: Networks and computer systems need certain 
resources to operate e.g. memory, disk space, CPU time, data structures and access to other 
computer systems. If an attacker is able to consume these resources, the system's network 
connectivity is affected and hosts are prevented from communicating on the network. For 
example, in the case of SYN flooding [10] an attacker sends a series of connection requests 
to a machine by sending SYN packets. For each SYN packet received, the victim machine 
reserves one of a limited number of data structures required to complete the impending 
connection but the attacker never sends the ACKs. Resultantly all available data structures at 
victim machine are committed and any legitimate connection requests are denied. 
Moreover, an attacker might consume memory or disk space at target machines or 
saturate data structures for holding process information like process identifiers, process table 
entries etc. or consume a large amount of CPU time in processing useless information, thus 
degrading the system performance and even denying it's use to legitimate users. 
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4.3 Network Detection of DDOS Attacks 
DDOS attacks are conducted against systems using network resources and involve 
exchanging command and response packets between intruders, masters and agents. Also, 
attack packets traverse the network from agents to targets. This implies that network packet 
monitoring and analysis can be employed for detection of these attacks. 
Observations from available codes indicate that attack signatures would differ among 
various implementations. However, each would employ a particular protocol type and port 
number for communication among components. There has to be a pre-defined command 
structure and some set sequence in exchange of commands and responses, which is strictly 
followed to ensure operability. Commands and responses, which are usually enclosed in data 
portions of packets can be identified through string comparisons. Therefore, capturing traffic 
on shared network segments and carrying out packet analysis provides a viable approach to 
identifying these tell tale attack signature patterns and make this attack detectable. 
4.4 NFR Filter for DDOS Attack Tool "mstream" 
In later half of 1999, a number of DDOS attack tools like Trinoo, TFN, Stacheldraht 
and Shaft appeared on the Internet, which were used in a number of attacks against different 
sites. In April, 2000 a new code base was discovered on few machines which had 
functionality almost similar to earlier tools but lacked somewhat in feature availability. It 
was observed to be still in development phase and was termed "mstream". Source code for 
this attack was anonymously posted to BUGTRAQ email lists and vul-
dev@securityfocus.com on 29th April, 2000 and an analysis was presented in [11] and [12]. 
As part of our research, an NFR filter has been developed for detection of this attack 
whose details are given in the following text. 
4.4.1 Analysis of Source Code for "mstream" 
The source code for mstream reveals that mstream attack system, like any typical 
DDOS tool, consists of "Intruders" (a provision of three is there), one or more "Masters" and 
a large number of "Agents". 
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Intruder code was not included with the package. Source code for master was 
"master.c" and that for agent was "server.c". Analysis of the code for master indicates that 
master utilizes TCP port 6723 and awaits for a connection from intruder. It receives pre-
defined commands from intruders and handles them as complete strings. This implies use of 
any client TCP program as an intruder that has the capability to buffer complete command 
before sending. This would ensure that each TCP packet sent to master contains the whole 
command in one packet. This is unlike Telnet protocol, which sends one character per 
packet and that is why Telnet cannot be used for this purpose. 
At the start of connection, intruder gets authenticated by supplying the password 
"sex" in data portion of the first packet sent to master. If password is correct, user is 
provided with a prompt "> ". Otherwise, the connection is refused. In either case, if there 
are other intruders logged into the system, they all are intimated regarding success or failure 
of the new connection. The commands sent from intruder to master consist of up to three 
space delimited fields and are un-encrypted. On receiving these commands, the master 
responds back to intruder as well as originates it's own commands to agents. The sequence 
of packets exchanged between Intruders and Masters is depicted in Figure 4.2. 
The code for master shows that communication between master and agent uses UDP 
port 7983 on agents and UDP port 9325 on masters. The commands sent from masters to 
agents are "/" separated argument lists with multi-item arguments being ":" separated lists. 
The source code for agent is named "server.c" and depicts agents receiving commands from 
masters on UDP port 7983. When an agent starts up, it sends a "newserver" message to all 
pre-defined masters on UDP port 9325. This serves as an indication to the Masters that this 
Agent is now active and can be added to their Agent database. Once running, an Agent 
awaits commands from Masters. On receiving a command to attack one or more targets, it 
initiates a TCP Ack flood against the victims. An Agent sends a response back to Master 
only when it receives a "ping" command to see if it is alive. In response to "ping" it sends 
back a "pong". The sequence of packets exchanged between Masters and Agents is shown in 
Figure 4.3 . 
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Intruder Master 
• )Ir I sex\n ~--------- -- - -- -------- ---------------------------- ---
•--------------------------------------------------------~ >I ... 1(------•• 
••------~1 help\n ~--- -- ----- ----------------- -- ---- -- ------------------
•--------- ------------------ ------ ~ .... __ \_n_A_v_a_il_ab_J_e_c_o_m_m_a_n_d_s_: _\n __ _:--11(-----• 
•--------------------- ---- -- stream stream attack !\n 
servers 
ping 
who 
mstream 
Prints all known servers.\n 
ping all servers.\n 
tells you the ips of the people 
logged in\n 
lets you stream more than one 
ip at a time.\n 
••-----11-.:l __ s_e_r_ve_r_s\_n_~~-----------------------------------------------------
•--------- -- - -------------- The following ips are known servers:\n 
• -- -- -- --------------------~ .... _____ [_se_r_ve_r_J_i_p_a_d_d_re_s_sJ_\_n ____ ___., ... 1(-----• 
•----------- ---------------~ [server2 ip address]\n ... ,-:-----•• 
I 
I 
I 
I 
••----~)r~I ping\n ~-- ----------------- --------------------- ------------
• ----- ---------------------~ pinging all servers.\n ..,I.:------•• 
•--------------------------------- -- ------- -- ------------~~-->-~ ... , I(------•· 
• --------------- ----- Got pong number I from [server! ip address]\n 
•-------------------- Got pong number 2 from [server2 ip address]\n 
I 
I 
I 
I 
••-----i._ .. , who\n ~--------- -- ------- - --------------- - -------------- ---
•--------------------------~~-----\n_C_ur_r_en_t_ly_o_nl_in_e_:_\n _____ ~I'""'.:.-----• 
•-------------------------- ~ Socket number O [intruder host name]\n 1!""'1(.-----• 
Figure 4.2: Exchange of packets between Intruder and Master 
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Intruder Master 
••----)l'~I stream [target ip address] [sec] \n ~-------------------------------- .... 
•-------------------- Streaming [target ip address] for [sec] seconds.\n 
•---- ----------------------------------------------------~ ___ > __ l"'I •----•• 
mstream [target ipl :target ip2: ... ] [sec] \n ---------------------------- .... 
• -------------- Mstreaming [target ipl:target ip2: ... ] for [sec] seconds.\n 
•-------------------------------------- - -----------------~ > I • • 
• )l' I quit\n ~-------------------------------------------------- .... 
Figure 4.2 (contd): Exchange of packets between Intruder and Master 
Master Agent 
•-----------------------------------·---------------1 newserver I• • 
• )l' 1 ping ~-------------------------------------------------- .... 
•---------------------------------------------------~ pong I • • 
••------,!1),~l __ s_tr_e_aml_[t_a_rg_e_t 1_·p_a_d_dr_e_ss_Jl_[s_e_cJ_~~--------------------------------.... 
Mstream/[target ipl:target ip2: ... ]/[sec] ----------------------------.... 
Figure 4.3: Exchange of packets between Master and Agent 
4.4.2 Attack Signatures for "mstream" 
When an mstream DDOS attack is under progress, there is a sequence of predefined 
command and response string pairs that are exchanged between the Intruders, Masters and 
Agents. Moreover, the attack packets generated by the Agents and directed towards the 
target also have some signatures that can be detected. 
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The command and response string pairs between intruders and masters that can be 
captured in the network traffic and can help identify that communication between intruder 
and master is in progress, are given in Table 4.1 while the command and response pairs 
exchanged between masters and agents that can help detect communication between them are 
given in Table 4.2. The attack packets have certain fixed signatures that are given in Table 
4.3. 
Table 4.1 Commands from Intruders and responses from Masters 
COMMAND STRING 
"sex" 
"stream" 
"quit" 
"servers" 
"help" 
"who" 
"ping" 
"mstream" 
RESPONSE STRING 
"Password accepted for connection from" 
"Usage: stream <hostname> <seconds> 
or 
"Unable to resolve" 
or 
"Streaming" 
"has disconnected." 
"Server file doesn't exist, creating ;" 
or 
"The following ips are known servers:" 
"Available commands:" 
"Socket number" 
"Pinging all servers." 
"Usage: mstream <ipl:ip2:ip3: ... > <seconds>" 
or 
"Mstreaming" 
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Table 4.2 Commands from Masters and responses from Agents 
COMMAND STRING RESPONSE STRING 
NIL "new server" 
"ping" "pong" 
"stream/IP/seconds" 
"mstream/IPl [:IP2[:IPN] ]/seconds" 
NIL 
NIL 
Table 4.3 "mstream" attack signatures 
PROTOCOL HEADER 
IP Header 
TCP Header 
ATTACK PACKET SIGNATURES 
The protocol type is TCP, however, no 
connection establishment is carried out before 
sending the packets. 
All packets have spoofed source IP addresses i.e. 
almost all packets will have a source IP address 
outside of the originating network. 
Source and destination ports are spoofed. 
Ack flag is set. 
Ack number field is zero. 
Window size field is set to 16384 
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4.4.3 Filter Implementation 
Network traffic generated by the mstream attack can be categorized into three parts; 
communication between Intruder and Master, Master and Agent and the attack stream 
directed towards the target. In order to detect mstream attack, NFR filter can detect each part 
separately and then correlate the gathered information to determine if an attack is actually 
under progress. 
The filter has been designed to have the above functionality. There are three main 
components; one for detecting traffic across TCP connection between Intruder and Master, 
the second to track UDP packets exchanged between Master and Agents and the third one to 
capture attack packets from the Agents. In the first part, the filter utilizes multi-siganture 
detection principle i.e it does not indicate presence of an attack packet on occurrence of a 
single event. The filter has defined states corresponding to the command-response pairs and 
enters or leaves states on detection of pertinent attack signatures. This enables a higher 
degree of certainty to be achieved in positive identification of attack related strings found in 
network traffic. For the second and the third part, this leverage is not available because of 
scarcity of traffic between masters and agents. The agents are mostly silent, except for the 
"pong" response to "ping" command. Moreover, this is a UDP session where there is no 
connection to follow and all packets are pretty much independent. The third part of filter 
entirely consists of one way traffic. It has an additional component which is time based. It 
fires up every fixed time interval and basically provides a warning on count of attack packets 
exceeding a particular number. 
The developed NFR filter is given in Appendix A and the pseudo-code is shown in 
Figure 4.4. The explanation of filter implementation based on pseudo-code follows: 
Lines 1-2: These lines define the "Schema" and "Recorder" for this filter. Schema 
specifies the format in which the data collected by the NFR engine for this filter should be 
recorded to disk while the recorder statement specifies whether the "list" or the "histogram" 
recorder is to be used, which configuration file is to be seen and which schema to follow. 
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1 define "SCHEMA" 
2 define "RECORDER" 
3 
4 filter Intruder_Master ( ) 
5 for each arriving packet 
6 if protocol = tcp and tcp_conn_dest_port = 6723 
7 then declare variable $blob in current TCP session 
8 if $blob = NULL 
9 then $blob ~ new packet ( tcp data ) 
10 else $blob ~ cat [ previous $blob, new packet ( tcp data ) ] 
11 
12 while 1 = 1 
13 do $z ~ first character of $blob 
14 while $z = " \n" or $z = "\x20" or $z = "\x3e" 
15 do $blob ~ $blob with $z removed 
16 $z ~ first character of $blob 
17 search for first occurrence of "\n" in $blob 
18 if "\n" not found in $blob 
19 then exit while loop 
20 else $line ~ portion of $blob till "\n" 
21 $blob~ $blob with $line removed 
22 if src_ip = tcp_conn_src 
23 then split $line into individual words 
24 $first ~ first word of $line 
25 if $first = "sex" 
26 then set WARNING flag 
27 initialize alert Message 
28 SET$pwd 
29 else if $first = "stream" 
30 then $second ~ second word of $line 
31 $third ~ third word of $line 
32 SET $stream 
33 else if $first = "quit" 
¾ ~T$~ 
35 else if $first = "servers" 
36 SET $servers 
37 else if $first= "help" 
38 SET$help 
39 else if $first = "who" 
40 SET$who 
41 else if $first = "ping" 
42 SET$help 
43 else if $first = "mstream" 
44 then $second ~ second word of $line 
Figure 4.4: Pseudo code for DDOS filter 
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$third f- third word of $line 
SET $mstream 
else if src_ip = tcp_conn_dest 
then $response f- $line 
if $pwd is SET 
then search $response for string "Password 
accepted for connection" 
if string found 
then set WARNING flag 
initialize alert Message 
RESET$pwd 
if $stream is SET 
then search $response for any of the strings 
"Usage: stream <hostname> <seconds>" or 
"Unable to resolve" or "Streaming" 
if string found 
then set WARNING flag 
initialize alert Message 
RESET $stream 
if $quit is SET 
then search $response for string "has 
disconnected'' 
if string found 
then set WARNING flag 
initialize alert Message 
RESET$quit 
if $servers is SET 
then search $response for any of the strings 
"Server file does 'nt exist, creating ;" or 
"The following ips are known servers:" 
if string found 
then set WARNING flag 
initialize alert Message 
RESET $servers 
if $help is SET 
then search $response for string "Available 
commands" 
if string found 
then set WARNING flag 
initialize alert Message 
RESET$he1p 
if $who is SET 
then search $response for string "Socket 
number" 
if string found 
then set WARNING flag 
Figure 4.4(contd): Pseudo code for DDOS filter 
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91 initialize alert Message 
92 RESET $who 
93 if $ping is SET 
94 then search $response for string "Pinging 
95 all servers." 
96 if string found 
97 then set WARNING flag 
98 initialize alert Message 
99 RESET $ping 
100 if $mstream is SET 
101 then search $response for any of the strings 
102 "Usage: mstream<ipl :ip2: ... ><seconds>" 
103 or "Mstreaming" 
104 if string found 
105 then set WARNING flag 
106 initialize alert Message 
107 RESET $mstream 
108 if WARNING flag set 
109 then record required PARAMETERS 
110 generate an ALERT 
111 else return 
112 
113 
114 
115 filter Master-Agent () 
116 for each arriving packet 
117 if protocol= udp and udp_dest_port = (6723 or 7983) 
118 then $contents f- first 4 chars of udp.blob 
119 if $contents = "ping" or "pong" 
120 then set WARNING flag 
121 initialize alert Message 
122 else if first 6 chars of udp.blob = "stream" or 
123 first 7 chars of udp.blob = "mstream" 
124 then $cmd f- contents of udp.blob uptil first"/" 
125 $target_ip f- contents of udp.blob between first and second "/" 
126 set WARNING flag 
127 initialize alert Message 
128 else if first 9 chars of udp.blob = "newserver" 
129 then set WARNING flag 
130 initialize alert Message 
131 if WARNING flag set 
132 then record required PARAMETERS 
133 generate an ALERT 
134 else return 
Figure 4.4(contd): Pseudo code for DDOS filter 
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135 count= 0 
136 filter Attack_Packets () 
137 for each arriving IP packet 
138 if protocol = tcp 
139 then $ip_addr ~ src IP addr of packet 
140 split $ip_addr into parts at each "." 
141 $first~ first part of $ip_addr 
142 $second~ second part of $ip_addr 
143 if $first and $second constitute your network address 
144 then check ACK Flag in tcp header 
145 get value of Ack Number field in tcp header 
146 get value of Window Size field in tcp header 
147 if ACK Flag is SET and Ack Number= 0 and 
148 Window Size= 16384 
149 then count= count +1 
150 else return 
151 else return 
152 else return 
153 
154 
155 filter Send_Alert ( ) 
156 for each ending of 5 seconds time interval 
157 if count >= 50 
158 then initialize alert MESSAGE 
159 send an ALERT 
160 RESET count 
161 else return 
Figure 4.4: Pseudo code for DDOS filter 
Line 4-5: This forms the start of NFR filter for monitoring control traffic between 
Intruder and Masters. It's implementation in N-code is done through "filter" command. 
Filter command specifies the trigger event that causes the N-code to execute whenever a 
packet is received satisfying the stated conditions. The trigger event defined here is the 
arrival of a TCP packet. For each arriving TCP packet, the NFR engine begins processing 
the packet in order to gather data required by this filter. 
Line 6: This line restricts processing by applying a selection criteria on tcp packets 
received by NFR engine. As per this criteria, only those tcp packet are processed, which are 
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having the tcp connection destination port as 6723. This implies that the packet source or 
destination port has to be 6723 and this port has to be the destination port of tcp connection. 
Lines 7-10: These lines declare a variable $blob in the TCP session. The declare 
statement causes the variable to be associated with the current TCP session and is used to 
store state information of the connection. The variable $blob is meant to hold and 
accumulate the data portions of TCP packets as they arrive. It is done through referencing 
the packet variable "tcp.blob", which is supplied by the NFR engine during runtime. 
Line 12: This line defines a while loop that continues untill some stated condition 
makes control jump out of the loop. The condition here is when there is no data to be 
processed by the NFR engine. 
Lines 13-16: These lines remove new line character, space or the left angle 
bracket, if present, from the start of the contents of $blob. This is to facilitate further 
processmg. 
Lines 17-21: This portion searches the contents of $blob for the first occurrence of 
a new line character. It either extracts the complete line from the contents of $blob as $line 
or if a complete line is not found, causes control to jump out of the "while" loop and wait for 
an additional packet to arrive whose contents when concatenated with the previous contents 
of $blob may produce a complete line for further processing. The N-code implementation 
uses the functions "index", which returns the position of the new line character "\n" and the 
function "substr" that forms a new string from start of $blob till the returned position of "\n". 
After extracting $line, it removes its contents from $blob for later processing of contents of 
$blob. 
Line 22: This line specifies another selection criteria for tcp packets being 
processed. Only those packets are passed forward which have originated from the source of 
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the established tcp connection. This is to select the packets originating from intruder which 
contain intruder to master password and commands. 
Lines 23-24: Each packet from intruder to master consists of either the password 
(the first packet of the connection) or a command line. The first word of the packet contents 
is the command and if the syntax requires, the second and the third word may be the 
arguments. These code lines split the contents of variable $line into individual words and 
store the first word in variable $first for subsequent comparisons. 
Lines 25-28: The first packet from Intruder to Master contains the password "sex". 
These lines check to see if the contents of $first are "sex". If true, it indicates start of a 
session between Intruder and Master. Therefore, the "Warning" flag is set and a variable is 
initialized to hold the warning message, which is subsequently passed to NFR Alert System. 
Moreover, a state variable $pwd is set to indicate that the password has been seen on the 
wire. It will later help in identifying the response from Master to Intruder. 
Lines 29-46: These code lines identify mstream commands contained in each 
packet by comparing contents of variable $first with each of the strings "stream", "quit", 
"servers", "help", "who", "ping" and "mstream". On identifying a particular command the 
concerned state variable ($stream, $quit, $servers, $help, $who, $ping or $mstream) is set, 
indicating that this command has been seen. This variable later helps to isolate Master 
responses. In case of commands "stream" and "mstream", the packet also contains additional 
arguments like target IP address and the duration of attack in seconds. Therefore, in these 
cases, the target IP address and duration of attack are also stored in variables $second and 
$third for later use. 
Line 47-48: These lines of code are meant to capture Master responses to Intruder 
commands on the same tcp connection. These lines specify that only those tcp packets are to 
be processed which have the source IP address same as the destination IP address of the 
established tcp connection. The destination of the existing tcp connection is the Master. 
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Therefore, these lines process packets originating from the Master and store their contents in 
variable $response for further comparisons. 
Lines 49-107: These lines constitute a senes of if-else constructs to identify 
response to a particular command being transmitted from Master to Intruder. For each of the 
mstream commands, there is a predefined response or a set of response strings representing 
various states in communication. In order to identify the command-response pairs, the first 
step is to check the condition of state variables $stream, $quit, $servers, $help, $who, $ping 
and $mstream. These state variables indicate earlier detection of the concerned command 
packet on the network. When command has been identified, the packet contents are 
compared with predefined response or set of responses in question. A decision is made 
whether the response packet contains the appropriate response string. If a match is found it 
indicates detection of the command-response pair between Intruder and Master, which gives 
a fairly positive indication of communication between "mstream" components. Accordingly, 
for each case the warning flag is set, an alert message is initialized and the concerned state 
variable $stream, $quit, $servers, $help, $who, $ping or $mstream is reset. 
Lines 108-110: These lines check to see if the warning flag is set. If warning flag 
is found set, the required information from the packet is recorded to the defined recorder and 
NFR engine sends an alert to NFR Alert system. 
Lines 115-116: These lines define the start of NFR filter for monitoring control 
traffic between Masters and Agents. The implementation in N-code is again done through 
"filter" command. The filter command, in this case, specifies the trigger event as the arrival 
of a UDP packet. Therefore, for each arriving udp packet, the NFR engine begins processing 
the received packet and gathers data required by this filter. 
Lines 117-118: These lines define the selection criteria for udp packets received by 
the NFR engine. Udp packets having the destination port as 9325 or 7983 are only accepted 
for further processing. This is because in an "mstream" communication between Master and 
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Intruder, the packets destined for Agents are sent to port 7983/udp and the packets meant for 
Master are destined to port 9325/udp. The contents of the udp packet are stored in the 
variable $contents for later comparison. 
Lines 119-121: These lines are concerned with the command-response pair "ping" 
and "pong". The variable $contents is compared with the two strings "ping" and "pong" and 
if a match is found the warning flag is set. At the same time an alert message is initialized 
for passing on to the NFR Alert System. 
Lines 122-127: These lines are concerned with Master to Agent command 
"stream" and "mstream". The first six characters of the udp.blob are compared with string 
"stream" and the first seven characters with string "mstream". A match indicates this 
command being sent to Agent. The command and the target IP addresses in udp packet 
payload are "/" separated. These arguments are extracted form the contents of udp.blob and 
stored in variables $cmd and $target_ip, respectively, for later processing. At the same time 
the warning flag is set and an alert message is initialized. 
Lines 128-130: These lines are concerned with the Agent to Master message of 
"newserver" which every server sends when it is first executed. The first nine characters of 
udp.blob are compared with the string "newserver" and if a match is found the warning flag 
is set and an alert message is initialized. 
Lines 131-133: These lines check to see if the warning flag is set. If found set, the 
required information from the packet is recorded to the defined recorder and NFR engine 
sends an alert to NFR Alert system. 
Line 135: This line declares and initializes a variable "count" for counting the 
number of attack packets received by NFR engine. It is a global variable and is declared 
outside the filter. 
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Lines 136-137: These lines define the start of NFR filter for monitoring the attack 
traffic originating from agents and directed towards the target. The implementation in N-
code is through the "filter" command. The trigger event is specified as the arrival of any IP 
packet. Therefore, for each arriving IP packet the NFR engine begins processing the 
received packet data. 
Line 138: This line specifies selection criteria for processing IP packets received 
by NFR engine. Only those IP packets are processed, which are having protocol type as 
TCP. This is because the mstream attack traffic consists of TCP Ack packets. 
Lines 139-142: These lines extract the network address from the source IP address 
of TCP packets being processed by the NFR engine. Using N-code "split" function, the IP 
address is divided into parts at "." and the first two parts are stored in variables $first and 
$second. 
Line 143: This line compares the network address portion obtained from source IP 
address of the received packet with local network address where mstream detection is 
required. Comparison is made to isolate attack packets that do not originate from the local 
network. This is because the attack traffic consists of packets having spoofed source IP 
addresses. Consequently, it is expected that attack traffic will primarily consist of packets 
having source IP addresses other than the local network address. Therefore, further 
processing is only carried out, if comparison shows that packet did not originate from the 
local network. 
Lines 144-146: These lines check TCP header to get the values of Ack flag, Ack 
Number field and Window Size field. 
Lines 147-149: If Ack flag is found set, Ack number field is zero, and the Window 
size is set to 16384, the value of variable count is incremented to indicate that an additional 
attack packet has been detected on the network segmented by NFR. 
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Lines 155-156: These lines define a filter to send alerts to NFR engine. The N-
code implementation is done through the "timeout" qualifier, which enables the filter to 
execute after every 5 seconds interval. The filter checks the value of variable "count". If 
variable "count" is greater than or equal to 50, indicating detection of 50 attack packets in 
last 5 seconds, it initializes an alert message and sends an alert to NFR Alert System. After 
sending alert, the value of variable "count" is reset to zero. 
44 
CHAPTER 5 NFR FILTER FOR BUFFER OVERFLOW ATTACKS 
5.1 Buffer Overflow Attacks 
Buffer overflow attacks [13] are another major category of attacks against networked 
computer systems these days. This is the class of attacks which makes use of a weakness in 
C programing language where a programmer can corrupt the execution stack by writing past 
the end of a buffer declared in a routine or procedure. This results in modifying the return 
address, causing return from routine to jump to a random address which may either lie 
outside the process address space, resulting in segmentation fault and blocking the process or 
it may point to an arbitrary memory location where a particular code can be placed for 
execution. fu the later case, an attacker can execute his own code on target machine which is 
usually the code to spawn a shell and has under certain circumstances, superuser privileges. 
Buffer overflow attacks are common both in Unix as well as in the Windows 
environment and pose a major threat to computing community. The "futernet Worm" of 1988 
[14] used this attack as one of the means of gaining unauthorised access. They can be 
implemented either locally or from remote locations. Whatever the mode, the objective of a 
successful buffer overflow attack is generally to gain root or super user access at the target 
machine. Once a root shell is obtained, the attacker can proceed with whatever commands or 
actions he desires to be executed on the target machine. 
5.1.1 Attack Mechanism 
Buffer overflow attacks are attributed to a flaw in C language. C is a structured 
language which uses function calls as the basic unit of organization. To develop an 
understanding of the buffer overflow attack mechanism [ 15] and [ 16], an analysis is required 
to determine the sequence of events when a function call is made. 
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When a process is being executed it interacts with memory in Text, Data and Stack 
regions. Variables in the process can be declared either static or dynamic. Static variables 
are allocated at load time in the data segment while local variables are allocated at run time 
on the stack. The stack is generally used in implementation of procedure and function calls. 
It consists of logical stack frames that are pushed when calling a function and popped when 
returning. Each frame stores the information required by the process during and after the 
function call. They include the parameters that are passed to the function, the return address, 
the old frame pointer (FP) which is the data required to recover previous stack frame and 
space for any local variables declared within the function. 
When a function is called, the first action is to push the function arguments 
backwards onto stack. This is followed by the value of instruction pointer (IP) at the time of 
function call. This value of IP forms the return address which is the location from where 
program will continue execution when function call returns . Next, FP is pushed on stack as 
old frame pointer. Then the current stack pointer (SP) value is copied into FP to create the 
new FP and SP is advanced to reserve space for local variables. Figure 5.1 serves as an 
example of a small C program and resulting stack contents when a function call is made. 
void func ( int a, int b, int c ) { 
int X 1; 
int x2; 
char buff [4] ; 
} 
void main() { 
func ( 1, 2, 3 ); 
} 
1 
Higher Memory 
3 
2 
I 
rel 
old FP 
x l 
x2 
buff [4] 
Lower Memory 
Fig 5.1: Function call and resulting stack. 
} function arguments 
local 
variables 
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In this example, the buffer "buff' has been defined to hold four characters. When 
data is stored in buffer, the buffer gets filled starting at the bottom most location and grows 
upwards. It is clearly evident that if a programmer stores more data in buffer than it has 
space for, the data will overflow into the region allocated for variables above "buff' and with 
careful calculations, it should be possible to overwrite and modify the return address to point 
to a memory location where the programmer has his own code which he wants to execute. 
This is easily explained with the previous example modified as shown in Figure 5.2. 
char code[ ] = 
"\0xeb\0x lf\0x5e\0x4a\0x3b\0xl f' 
"\0x2d\0x8a\0x 1 f\0x I c\0x89\0x56" 
"\0x80\0x00\0x0f\0xf0" ; 
void func ( int a, int b, int c ) { 
int x I; 
int x2; 
char buff [4] ; 
strcpy (buff, code); 
} 
void main () { 
func ( 1, 2, 3 ); 
printf("This will not be 
printed.\n"); 
Higher Memory 
3 
2 
1 
rel 
old FP 
xi 
x2 
buff [4] 
Lower Memory 
Ox 80 00 Of fc 
Ox 80 00 Of f8 
Ox 80 00 Of f6 
Ox 80 00 Of f4 
Ox 80 00 Of fO 
Fig 5.2: Stack after strcpy command. 
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Ox eb If Se 4a 
,) 
-
Lower Memory 
In this example, the program is modified to include a character array having a fake 
hexadecimal representation of the code we want to execute as a result of the buffer overflow. 
The "buff' is written with the contents of string "code" using strcpy command, from bottom 
to top. We observe that the string "code" has 16 characters, whereas the buffer can hold only 
four. This indicates that the contents of "code" will be written past the end of "buff'. If we 
count the number of bytes in stack and compare with the number of characters in the string 
being copied, we find that the bytes 13 thru 16 of "code" are copied into the memory location 
where the return address was previously stored. And if we manage to have the starting 
address of "buff' at bytes 13 thru 16 in string, when the function "func" returns IP gets 
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loaded with the starting address of "buf' and program execution shifts to instructions located 
inside the buffer. This describes the mechanism of arbitrary code execution through buffer 
overflow on stack. 
This buffer overflow is possible only where data is copied into the buffer without 
bounds checking as with C command "strcpy". Strcpy does not check to ensure that amount 
of data being copied into buffer is less than or equal to the buffer capacity. There are several 
standard C library functions for copying or appending strings like strcpy(), strcat(), sprintf() 
etc that have no provisions for boundary checking and do not ensure against overflow of 
received data. It has been left to the programmer to count the number of data bytes before 
copying them onto the stack. There is yet another function gets(), which inputs data into a 
buffer from stdin, stopping at a new line or EOF character. But this function also does not 
check for overflow of the buffer. If any of these functions is feeding data to a buffer of 
finite size, there always is a potential for exploitation in the form of buffer overflow attack. 
Another factor facilitating buffer overflows is the Unix file permission system. This 
feature combined with above weakness of C allows access to unrestricted system privilege 
[17]. When a user runs a program or shell script in Unix environment, the process in 
memory that handles program execution is owned by user who executes the program. 
However, the set user ID (SUID) feature in Unix allows a user to run programs or shell 
scripts as another user. The SUID bit is an indication to operating system that the program 
will run under the file owner's ID rather than the user's ID who runs the program. On all 
Unix implementations there are a large number of Unix files that are SUID type and are 
owned by root, implying that although these programs may be executable by under-
privileged users, they actually run in memory as the super user. It thus becomes possible for 
an attacker to exploit a bug in any of these programs and use buffer overflow to gain root 
access at the target machine. 
The technique described above is employed while implementing buffer overflow 
attacks. Usually a target program is selected which is SUID root and has a function 
containing "strcpy" type command that manipulates data without bounds checking into a 
buffer. Dependent upon target functionality, some means are devised to overflow the buffer 
and modify return address to point inside the buffer where a shell code is stored. When the 
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called function returns, program execution flow changes to execute the code and spawn a 
shell. Using the shell, the attacker has the ability to run any arbitrary commands. 
5.1.2 Remote Buffer Overflow Attacks 
The buffer overflow attack may be implemented locally or from remote location. On 
local machine, if a user has a less privileged interactive access, the buffer overflow may 
provide an un-restricted system access. On remote machines, a TCP connection is usually 
used to connect to target machine. If an attacker sends a packet containing shell code and is 
able to overflow a buffer at the target machine, the TCP connection gets connected to the 
shell program and attacker often has super user access. 
For our research, we are only considering remote buffer overflow attacks as they are 
the ones that can be detected using a packet capturing and analyzing facility like the NFR. 
5.2 Buff er Overflow Attacks Against SMTP Implementations 
Buffer overflow attacks are quite common in the Internet community. The reasons 
are programming flaws in commonly used, commercially available utility programs that 
allow exploitation of buffer overflows. One such utility is the mail facility on Internet and 
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is a TCP/IP protocol that supports electronic mail. 
Because of the vast use of mailing facility, SMTP implementations are a major target for 
launching a variety of buffer overflow attacks against applications built upon this protocol. 
SMTP is a client-server application that employs a TCP connection for 
communication [18]. The user interacts with User Agent (UA) to formulate the mail 
message. Mail message is handed over to Mail Transfer Agent (MT A), which in this case is 
an SMTP client. The client connects with SMTP server running on well-known port 25 at 
remote location and transfers mail using this protocol. The receiver then receives mail 
through his UA. 
The client MTA and server MTA communicate using SMTP. The protocol works 
thru exchange of commands and responses between the sending and receiving SMTPs. Since 
a TCP connection is used, the exchange of commands and responses involves TCP packets 
destined to port 25 on server side and an ephemeral port on client side. The mail commands 
sender 
user VA 
user VA 
receiver 
Fig 5.3 
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and replies are composed of characters from ASCII character set and each 
command/response is enclosed in a separate packet. This indicates that in order to conduct a 
remote buffer overflow attack against an application using SMTP, the attacker needs to send 
TCP packets containing code to overflow the buffer and destined for port 25 on the target 
machine running SMTP server. 
5.3 Network Detection of Buffer Overflow Attacks Against SMTP 
Buffer overflow attacks involve client SMTP sending packets containing attack code 
to overflow some buffer at server SMTP running at remote machine on target network. This 
implies that detection should be possible through analysis of network traffic being exchanged 
between the two entities. Traffic analyis can look for signature patterns. The signatures can 
be developed through the following ways: 
(a) The SMTP packets traveling from sender-SMTP to receiver-SMTP have a 
known structure specified by RFC-821. We can investigate the average packet sizes 
required for each of the commands m a normal SMTP transaction and check for 
packets that are longer. 
(b) In order to have an interactive session with root privileges, an attacker needs 
to send a piece of code to the target machine to spawn a shell. We can carry out an 
analysis of the code required to execute the shell commands at target machine for 
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various machine architectures and check for SMTP packets that can possibly contain 
that code based on code size and contents. 
5.4 NFR Filter for Buff er Overflow Attack in SMTP 
An NFR filter has been developed for detection of buffer overflow attacks against 
SMTP implementations. The details are covered in the following text. 
5.4.1 Analysis of SMTP Command Structure 
The SMTP commands define user requests during the mail transfer process. Each 
command is a four letter "keyword" followed by zero or more arguments and terminates in a 
two character end of line token (carriage return and line feed). The various commands and 
their syntax are given as under: 
HELO It is used by client to identify itself. It's argument is domain name of 
client. 
MAIL 
RCPT 
DATA 
QUIT 
HELO <SP>: <Client Domain Name> <CRLF> 
It identifies the mail sender. It's argument is the sender e-mail 
address. 
MAIL <SP> FROM: <Sender E-mail Address> <CRLF> 
It identifies the recipient and it's argument is recipient's e-mail 
address. 
RCPT <SP> TO: <Recipient E-mail Address> <CRLF> 
It is used to indicate start of message. Message follows in the next 
packet. It has no arguments. 
DATA<CRLF> 
The packets that follow this command contain the message. The 
message is terminated by sending the last packet containing only a 
period".". 
<CRLF> . <CRLF> 
It terminates the message. 
QUIT<CRLF> 
RSET 
VRFY 
NOOP 
TURN 
EXPN 
HELP 
SEND 
SOML 
SAML 
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It aborts the current mail transaction. 
RSET <CRLF> 
It verifies the address of recipient. It's argument is recipient's e-mail 
address. 
VRFY: <Recipient E-mail Address> <CRLF> 
It is used to check the status of recipient. 
NOOP<CRLF> 
It allows sender and recipient to change positions. 
TURN <CRLF> 
It asks receiving host to expand the mailing list sent as argument with 
this command. 
EXPN: <mailing list > <CRLF> 
It asks receiving host to send information about command sent as 
argument. 
HELP: <command > <CRLF> 
It specifies that mail is to be delivered to recipient's terminal. It's 
argument is e-mail address of the sender. 
SEND <SP> FROM: <Sender E-mail Address> <CRLF> 
It specifies that mail is to delivered to mailbox or terminal of recipient. 
Its argument is e-mail address of sender. 
SOML <SP> FROM: <Sender E-mail Address> <CRLF> 
It specifies that mail is to delivered to mailbox and terminal of 
recipient. It's argument is e-mail address of sender. 
SAML <SP> FROM: <Sender E-mail Address> <CRLF> 
Now considering maximum lengths of arguments as mentioned in [19], we see that 
the following limits are imposed: 
User 
Domain 
Path 
The maximum total length of a user name is 64 characters. 
The maximum total length of a domain name or number is 64 
characters. 
The maximum total length of a forward or reverse path 1s 256 
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characters. 
Command Line The maximum total length of a command line including the 
command word is 512 characters. 
Text Line The maximum total length of a text line is 512 characters. 
Based on above discussion, we can make conclusions about sizes of SMTP command 
arguments. If arguments are found to comply with these sizes, packets are most likely free of 
any attack code. Table 5.1 gives the deduced values. 
Table 5.1 Allowed lengths of SMTP command arguments 
COMMAND 
HELO 
MAIL, RCPT, SEND, 
SOML,SAML,VRFY 
DATA, QUIT, RSET, 
NOOP, TURN 
EXPN 
HELP 
ARGUMENT 
Domain·name of client 
Sender/Receiver e-mail address 
Nil 
Mailing List 
Command 
ARGLENGTH 
64 
129 
0 
64 
4 
The argument of the HELO command is a domain name which should not be larger 
than 64 characters. The second row commands have arguments of the type user@domain-
name. Each of the user name and domain name cannot exceed 64 characters, so the 
argument of this command should not exceed 129 characters including the "@" sign.. The 
EXPN command contains the name of the mailing list, which like the user name should not 
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be more than 64 characters. Similarly, HELP command cannot have more than 4 characters 
as all commands are 4 characters each and remaining commands cannot have any character 
as the arguments. 
5.4.2 Analysis of Code for Buffer Overflow Attack 
In order to spawn a shell we need to execute a command like execve() at the target. 
This C function is meant to load and run another program. The syntax of this command is, 
"int execve ( char *pathname, char *argv[ ], char *envp[ ] )", where pathname points to the 
name of the path that identifies the new process file, "argv[]" is an array of character 
pointers to null terminated strings which constitute the argument list available to new process 
image, and "envp[]" is an array of character pointers to null terminated strings which 
constitute the environment of the new process. 
However, to include this function in the run time environment of a process at target 
machine, we need to first write it down in assembly language, providing other required 
parameters and then send it in a packet over the network along with some additional 
components to ensure that it does get executed properly at the target machine. The contents 
of a probable buffer overflow attack packet are shown in Figure 5.4. It consists of some 
padding of "no operations" (NOPs) followed by a jump command, the shell code, a call 
instruction, string "/bin/sh" and a number of bytes filled with return address. The attack code 
is copied into the buffer in stack at target machine. The end of attack packet, which is filled 
with return address is the portion that overflows the buffer and gets written onto return 
address space of stack. This return address points somewhere in the NOP region, so that 
when the current function returns program execution is transferred to attack code. Placing of 
NOPs facilitates an approximate guessing of return address. After the initial NOPs is the 
JMP command, which employs Instruction Pointer (IP) relative addressing. The use of IP 
relative addressing allows control to be transferred from point to point in the code without 
actually knowing exact memory locations at target machine where attack code would be 
copied. The JMP command transfers control to a pre-determined offset to CALL instruction. 
The CALL is located right before string "/bin/sh". As CALL instruction gets executed the 
address of string is pushed onto the stack as return address, from where it can be grabbed and 
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stored in a register for later use with "execve" function. The CALL instruction simply calls 
the start of shell code which gets executed to spawn a shell. 
The above discussion gives us the basic idea of how code for buffer overflow attack 
can be developed. In fact, "shell codes" i.e. codes to spawn shells for various machine 
architectures have already been developed and are freely available from various web sites. 
An attacker simply needs to use that code to formulate attack packet by padding some NOPs 
function 
arguments 
local 
variables 
Stack Contents 
{ arg 3 arg 2 
arg I 
ret addr 
old FP 
local var I 
local var 2 
buff [ l 
Higher Memory 
Addresses 
Lower Memory 
Addresses 
Attack Packet Contents 
ret addr 
ret addr 
ret addr 
ret addr 
/bin/sh 
call 
call 
Shell Code 
jmp 
jmp 
NOOP 
NOOP 
NOOP 
Figure 5.4: Attack packet versus target buffer. 
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at the start and a number of instances of return address at the end for any application he 
wants to attack, and send the packet on the network. The sample shell codes for i386/Linux 
and SPARC/Solaris, as obtained from [15], are given in Figure 5.5 as an example. 
5.4.2.1 Considering Attack Packet Size: We observe that the number of bytes in 
shellcode, in case of i386/Linux is 45 and those for SP ARC/Solaris is 60. However, to 
implement a successful buffer overflow attack, the shell code is padded with a large number 
jmp 
pop! 
movl 
xorl 
movb 
movl 
lea! 
lea! 
int 
xorl 
movl 
inc 
call 
string 
sethi 
or 
sethi 
and 
add 
xor 
add 
std 
st 
st 
mov 
ta 
xor 
mov 
ta 
Assembly language code (shell code) and its hex representation for i386/Linux. 
0xlf 
esi 
%esi , 0x8(%esi) 
%eax, %eax 
$0xb, %al 
%esi, %ebx 
0x8(%esi), %ecx 
0x8(%esi), %edx 
$0x80 
%ebx, %ebx 
%ebx, %eax 
%eax 
-0x24 
\"/bin/sh\" 
Char shellcode[ ] = 
"\xeb\x 1 t\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x3 l \xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c" 
"\xb0\x0b\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x3 l \xdb" 
"\x89\xd8\x40\xcd\x80\xe8\xdc\xft\xft\xff/bin/sh"; 
Total bytes = 45 
Assembly language code (shell code) and its hex representation for SPARC/Solaris. 
0xbd89a, %16 
%16, 0x26e, %16 
0xbdcda, % 17 
%sp, %sp, %00 
%sp, 8, %ol 
%02, %02, %02 
%sp, 16, %sp 
%16, [%sp, - 16] 
%sp, [%sp - 8] 
%g0, [%sp - 4] 
0x3b, %gl 
8 
%07 , %07, %00 
I , %gl 
8 
Char shellcode[ ] = 
"\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x 15\xa 1 \x6e\x2t\x0b\xdc\xda\x90\x0b\x80" 
"\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x08\x94\x la\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x I 0\xec\x3b" 
"\xbt\xf0\xdc\x23\xbt\xf8\xc0\x23\xbt\xfc\x82\x 1 0\x20\x3 b\x9 l \xdO" 
"\x20\x08\x90\x 1b\xc0\x0t\x82\x10\x20\x01 \x9 l \xd0\x20\x08"; 
Total bytes = 60 
Figure 5.5: Sample shellcodes 
56 
of NOPs and return addresses. This facilitates setting an approximate value for return 
address to transfer program execution to the NOOP region and then to the attack code. 
Remote buffer overflow attacks being implemented in the Internet [5] indicate that this adds 
at least 300 bytes to the attack packet. This will result in the total number of bytes required 
to be sent in attack packet to not less than 345. Comparing this value with the argument 
lengths for SMTP commands as given in Table 5 .1, we reach at the following allowed packet 
lengths after adding some amount of safety margin for legitimate packets. 
Table 5.2 Allowed lengths of SMTP command packets 
COMMAND ALLOWED PKT LENGTHS 
HELO 
MAIL, RCPT, SEND, 
SOML,SAML,VRFY 
DATA, QUIT, RSET, 
NOOP, TURN 
EXPN 
HELP 
5.4.2.2 Considering Attack Packet Contents: 
85 
150 
4 
85 
10 
We see that the shell code contains 
the string "/bin/sh" in buffer overflow attack codes that attempt to obtain an interactive shell 
at the target, which is the objective in a mojority of the cases. So, it should be possible to 
check for presence of this string and determine whether or not the packet contains the attack 
code. 
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5.4.3 Filter Implementation 
NFR filter has been developed using N-code for gathering and processing packet 
data. The pseudo-code for the filter is given in Figure 5.5 and the N-code in Appendix A. 
An explanation of filter implementation based on pseudo-code follows. 
Lines 1-2: These lines define the "Schema" and "Recorder" for this filter. Schema 
specifies the format in which the data collected by the NFR engine for this filter should be 
recorded to disk while the recorder statement specifies whether the "list" or the "histogram" 
recorder is to be used, which configuration file is to be seen and which schema to follow. 
Lines 4-5: These lines define the trigger event that causes the NFR engine to begin 
processing the received packet and gather data required by this filter. The trigger event 
defined here is the arrival of a TCP packet that has originated from the client side of a TCP 
connection and is destined for port 25 which is the well known port for SMTP server. The 
implementation of this function in N-code is done through the "filter" command. The filter 
command specifies the trigger event and causes the N-code to execute whenever a packet is 
received that satisfies the stated conditions. 
Lines 6: This line is used to declare a variable $blob in the TCP session. The 
declare statement causes the variable to be associated with the current TCP session and is 
used to store state information associated with the connection. The variable $blob is meant 
to hold and accumulate the data portions of TCP packets as they arrive. 
Lines 8-10: This part assigns or concatenates the TCP data portion of packets to 
the variable $blob as the new packets arrive. The TCP data portions are extracted from the 
packets through referencing the packet variable "tcp.blob" which is supplied by the NFR 
engme. 
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SMTP_BOF () 
1 define "SCHEMA" 
2 define "RECORDER" 
3 
for each arriving packet 4 
5 
6 
do if src_host == client and dest_port == 25 
then declare variable $blob in current TCP session 
7 
8 if $blob = NULL 
9 then $blob ~ new packet ( tcp data ) 
10 else $blob ~ cat [ previous $blob, new packet ( tcp data ) ] 
11 
12 while 1 = 1 
13 do serach for first occurrence of "\n" in $blob 
14 if EOL not found in $blob 
15 then exit while loop 
16 else $line ~ portion of $blob till "\n" 
17 $z ~ first character of $line 
18 while $z = "" or $z = "\t" 
19 do $line~ $line with $z removed 
20 $z ~ first character of $line 
21 $zz ~ last character of $line 
22 while $zz = " " or $z = "\t" 
23 do $line ~ $line with $z removed 
24 $zz ~ last character of $line 
25 $cmd ~ first 4 characters of $line 
26 if $cmd = "DATA" or "QUIT" or "RSET" or 
27 "NOOP" or "TURN" 
28 then $Jen ~ length ( $line ) 
29 if $Jen> 4 
30 then $arg ~ $line from 5th character 
31 onwards 
32 SET warning flag 
33 if $cmd = "HELO" or "EHLO" 
34 then search for first occurrence of":" in $line 
35 $arg ~ portion of $line after " :" 
36 remove white spaces from start of $arg 
37 $Jen ~ length ( $arg) 
38 if $Jen > 85 
39 then SET warning flag 
40 if $cmd = "MAIL" or "SEND" or "SOML" or 
41 "SAML" or "VRFY" or "RCPT" 
42 then search for first occurrence of":" in $line 
43 $arg ~ portion of $line after":" 
44 remove white spaces from start of $arg 
Figure 5.6: Pseudo code for SMTP buffer overflow filter 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 else return 
59 
$len ~ length ( $arg ) 
if $len > 150 
then SET warning flag 
if $crud = "EXPN" 
then $arg ~ $line from 5th character onwards 
remove white spaces from start of $arg 
$len ~ length ( $arg ) 
if $len > 85 
then SET warning flag 
if $crud = "HELP" 
then $arg ~ $line from 5th character onwards 
remove white spaces from start of $arg 
$len ~ length ( $arg ) 
if $len > 10 
then SET warning flag 
if warning flag SET 
then check for string "bin/sh" in $arg 
if $arg has string "bin/sh" 
then $message ~ Alert warning with 
"bin/sh" string present 
else $message ~ Alert warning without 
"bin/sh" string 
generate an ALERT and record parameters 
$blob ~ $blob with $line removed 
Figure 5.6 (contd): Pseudo code for SMTP buffer overflow filter 
Line 12: This line defines an infinite "while" loop that continues till some stated 
condition makes the control jump out of the loop. 
Lines 13-16: This portion searches the contents of $blob for the first occurrence of 
a new line character. It either extracts the complete line from the contents of $blob as 
variable $line or if a complete line is not found, causes control to jump out of the "while" 
loop. It then waits for an additional packet to arrive whose contents when concatenated with 
the previous contents of $blob may produce a complete line for further processing. The N-
code implementation uses the functions "index", which returns the position of the new line 
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character "\n" and the function "substr" that forms a new string from start of $blob till the 
returned position of "\n". 
Lines 17-20: These lines remove white spaces if present at the start of $line by 
comparing the characters one by one with " " and "\t". The removal of white spaces, if 
present, would help extract the SMTP commands in the next steps. 
Lines 21-24: These lines remove white spaces if present at the end of $line by 
comparing the characters one by one with " " and "\t" starting with the last character in $line. 
White spaces, if present, would effect the length of argument of the SMTP command, which 
we intend monitoring. 
Lines 25: This line extracts the first four characters from the contents of $line in 
the variable $cmd. These four characters should form the SMTP command contained in the 
packet, if this is a command packet. 
Lines 26-32: This portion identifies the SMTP command type by comparing $cmd 
with strings "DATA", "QUIT", "RSET", "NOOP" and "TURN". The format of these 
commands specifies that they have no arguments and their packets should only have four 
characters which are the commands, excluding white spaces. In case a match is found, the 
length of the contents of $line is calculated and compared with 4. If length is found to be 
more, it indicates that there is some undesired argument in this packet which is then extracted 
and the warning flag is set. 
Lines 33-39: This portion is related to SMTP commands "HELO" and "EHLO". 
The command format specifies that command string is followed by ":" and then by the 
domain name of the client SMTP machine. If $line is found having any of these commands, 
the argument is extracted by locating the position of":" in $line and storing the portion after 
":" in $arg. Under normal circumstances the length of a domain name should not exceed 85 
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characters. Therefore, the length of $arg is calculated and if found more, the warning flag is 
set. 
Lines 40-47: This portion concerns SMTP commands "MAIL", "SEND", 
"SOML", "SAML", "VRFY" and "RCPT". They have e-mail address of sender or receiver 
as argument which can be as long a 128 characters. The argument is extracted by searching 
for ":" and storing the portion of $line following ":" as $arg. The length of $arg is then 
checked and if found more than 150 characters, the warning flag is set. 
Lines 48-53: This part looks for SMTP command "EXPN" whose argument is 
supposed to be a mailing list. The first four characters of $line are the command. Therefore, 
the argument is extracted starting from the 5th character, as $arg. After removing white 
spaces from $arg, its length is checked. If length is found to be more than 85 characters, the 
warning flag is set. 
Lines 54-59: This part deals with the SMTP command "HELP". The argument to 
this command is another SMTP command which will only be four characters. Therefore, the 
argument is extracted starting from the 5th character of $line and the length of argument is 
computed after removing white spaces. If length is found more than 10, the warning flag is 
set. 
Lines 61-67: These lines check the state of warning flag after the contents of $line 
have been processed for all SMTP commands. If warning flag is set, it is an indication that 
packet contains more data than is expected. Therefore, a further check is performed to see if 
the packet contains string "bin/sh" which is an indication of presence of shell code inside the 
packet. If string "bin/sh" is found, an alert message is initialized with warning about 
presence of string "bin/sh" inside the packet, otherwise a simple alert message is initialized 
to warn regarding detection of a packet having abnormal size data. 
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Line 68: Upon detection of an attack packet, an alert message is generated to NFR 
alert system which processes the message and displays it in the alert window in the GUI. 
Moreover, the pertinent data from the suspicious packet is also recorded in the recorder 
specified at the start of the code. 
Lines 70-72: These lines form the end of processing for the contents of $line, 
which were extracted from $blob. After this line has been processed, it is removed from the 
$blob and the loop starts again to extract the next line in $blob for processing, if present, or 
to exit the loop and wait for the arrival of another packet. 
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CHAPTER6 FILTER TEST RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Simulation of Attacks 
In order to check the efficacy of developed filters, we needed to simulate attack 
conditions and verify that filters were able to detect the ongoing attacks. For this purpose, 
NFR was installed on a machine connected to the network segment that could see traffic 
exchanged between intruder, master, agent and target in case of mstream attack and between 
attacker and target in case of buffer overflow attack. The filters were loaded into NFR and 
attacks were replayed. 
6.1.1 "mstream" Implementation 
DDOS attack mstream was implemented by obtaining the source code master.c and 
server.c for master and agent, respectively, and then compiling and running on computers in 
one of the labs. Since the code for mstream did not include the client code for intruder, 
"netcat 1.1 O" utility [20] was used for this purpose. 
"netcat 1.10" is a Unix utility that reads and writes data across network connections 
using either TCP or UDP protocol. It can initiate TCP connection to a port on the host 
specified at command line. After connection is established, standard input is sent to the host 
and whatever comes back across the connection is sent to the standard output. This allows 
the complete "mstream" command to be sent to the master in one TCP packet instead of 
being sent character by character as in Telnet. It, therefore, meets the requirement of the 
master code and allows the use of "netcat" as an Intruder. 
6.1.2 Buffer Overflow Attack Simulation 
The buffer overflow attack comprises sending fabricated attack packets containing 
overflow code to the target machine. In order to simulate buffer overflow attacks , netcat 
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1. 10 was used. The client netcat was used to make a TCP connection to port 25 (SMTP) on a 
host running SMTP server. The host would send back appropriate response indicating a 
successful connection. The client would then send the attack packet. The attack code was 
stored in a file at attacker machine and sent via input redirection during command line 
invocation of netcat. 
6.2 Filter Efficacy 
The filter analysis and detection results for both types of attacks are given as under: 
6.2.1 Results for mstream Attack 
Based on the rule sets defined by the NFR filter, NFR was able to detect the 
mstream attack successfully while the attack was under progress. All communication 
between attack components i.e., TCP session between an intruder and a master, UDP 
communication between a master and an agent and the "TCP ACK" attack packets generated 
by the agent were detected. The required data i.e., the source and destination IP addresses, 
source and destination ports and various commands and their arguments were recorded in 
defined NFR recorder along with logging of alert messages, which were generated by N-code 
and sent to the NFR alert system. Both the recorded data and alerts were available through 
the NFR GUI. Appendix C shows the output of NFR alert and query systems, as viewed in 
the GUI. 
It is being inferred that this filter will be capable of detecting this attack as long as 
network traffic in terms of the number of packets per second does not exceed the packet 
processing speed of IDS, implying that no packets get dropped. However, even under high 
traffic loads when packets get dropped by the IDS sensor, the probability of dropping 
intruder-master or master-agent communication packets, which are not high in number, is 
expected to be very small and NFR should still be able detect the attack. In the case of the 
attack stream from agent to target, the traffic generated is very high. But this coupled with 
the fact that the filter requires to detect only a small proportion of these attack packets to 
determine an ongoing attack, it can be concluded that detection of this attack will be done 
accurately. 
65 
6.2.2 Results for Buffer Overflow Attack 
The rule set defined for the buffer overflow filter was able to detect the situation 
involving a possible buffer overflow attack. The filter monitored all command packets 
directed from SMTP client to an SMTP server. It was able to identify various command 
types and based on length of data inside the packet, it could determine if an oversized packet 
was on the net. Moreover, having detected an oversize packet, it was able to check for 
presence of string "bin/sh" in the packet, which indicates a strong possibility of the buffer 
overflow code presence. The source and destination IP addresses and ports and the various 
commands and arguments were recorded in the defined NFR recorder. Alert messages were 
also generated by N-code and sent to NFR alert system. The recorded data and alerts were 
available for review through the NFR GUI (Appendix D). 
In this case, it has been observed that since all packets from client to server SMTP 
can be tracked and filter can accurately detect when a packet of extraordinary size is 
transferred over this connection, the warnings generated for most of the SMTP command 
packets should be accurate. However, this filter involves an approximation in detection. In 
case of commands like HELO, MAIL, RCPT, VRFY, EXPN, SEND, SOML and SAML, the 
protocol does not explicitly specify the length of arguments. When setting threshold values 
of suspicious packets for these commands, an arbitrary value has to be selected based on the 
maximum expected size of legitimate command arguments and the minimum size of attack 
code in the packet. Selected value depicts a compromise between the two extremes and may 
result in causing false positives. In case the observed false alarm rate exceeds acceptable 
limits, the values can be adjusted to accommodate larger packets. However, even with this 
approximation the filter will still provide adequate warning of buffer overflow scenarios. 
6.3 Conclusion and Future Work 
In this thesis, we have shown how network intrusions like "mstream" distributed 
denial of service attack and buffer overflow attacks against SMTP implementations can be 
detected by developing filters for NFR IDS based on attack signature analysis. The rule sets 
for filters are derived from attack code features described by packet header and payload 
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contents, sequence of packet arrival or both. Once attack signatures have been coded, they 
are capable of detecting known attacks with high precision. 
The signature based detection based on NFR filters thus provides an elegant system 
for detecting known network intrusions. However, there is still a lot that can be done to 
improve upon the existing system. NFR provides a versatile tool for network data collection. 
NFR language can define criteria for data selection that can be used to formulate an anomaly 
detection model. The buffer overflow filter, in fact implements anomaly detection in its 
primitive form. The NFR captures data, i.e. packet length, which is a metric defining a data 
attribute. The value of this metric combined with the presence or absence of string "bin/sh" 
determines when to declare an intrusion. A functional anomaly detection model can be 
formulated by defining a larger set of metrics to carry out decision making. 
Additionally, NFR filters provide us with the capability of detecting intrusions in real 
time and in most cases before any damage occurs. Therefore, upon detecting intrusions it 
should be possible to couple the system with preventive schemes capable of initiating 
remedial measures. The remedial measures could include an increased level of packet 
filtering at network router to drop the packets flagged as suspicious based on feedback from 
IDS. This would eliminate to some extent, the element of human intervention from response 
portion of NFR which would make the overall system more efficient. 
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APPENDIX A: NFR FILTER FOR DDOS ATTACK TOOL "mstream" 
# DETECTOR FILTER FOR "STREAM" DDOS ATTACK 
# 
# This filter has been designed to detect and monitor traffic 
# between Intruders, Masters and Agents in a DDOS attack tool 
# known as "MSTREAM" and to issue warnings and record required 
# information in case it detects an attack under progress. 
# 
# Our schema 
mstream_schema=library _schema:new( I ,["time", "ip", "int", "i p", "int", "string"] ,scope()); 
# Our recorder 
mstream_recorder=recorder("bin/list packages/ddos/mstream.cf g'' , "mstream_schema''); 
filter Intruder_Master tcp() 
{ 
# Filter for detecting communication between Intruder and Master. .. 
# This filter is triggered on each arrival of a TCP packet. 
# 
# Further processing on TCP packet is carried out only if the packet 
# has the destination port of the TCP connection as port 6723. 
# This is the port where master waits for connection from intruder. 
# 
if ( tcp.connDport == 6723 ) 
{ 
declare $blob inside tcp.connSym; 
# $blob is a local variable that holds and accumulates 
# the contents of TCP packets as they arrive. 
if ($blob == null) 
$blob = tcp.blob; 
else 
$blob= cat($blob, tcp.blob); 
while (I == I) 
{ 
# Remove leading "\n", space or">" from $blob, if present. 
$z = subs tr ($blob, 0, 1 ); 
while ( ($z == "\n") II ($z == "\x20") II ($z == "\x3e")) 
{ 
$blob = substr($blob, 1 ); 
$z = substr($blob,0, 1 ); 
) 
# Find the end of the first line by checking for next 
# occurrence of "\n". 
$x = index($blob, "\n"); 
if ($x < 0) 
break; 
$z = substr($blob,$x-1, 1); 
if ($z == '\r') 
$line= substr($blob,0,$x-1 ); 
else 
$line= substr($blob,0,$x); 
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# Stored the first line into "$line" for further processing. 
# $line has the "\n" or the "\r\n" removed from the end. 
# Remove the $line from the blob that we have 
# recently processed. 
$blob= substr($blob, $x + 1); 
# Declaring variables inside the current TCP connection for later use. 
# 
declare $first inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $second inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $third inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $pwd inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $stream inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $quit inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $servers inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $help inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $who inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $mstream inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $warning inside tcp.connSym; 
# 
# If packet originated from the src of TCP connection i.e. Intruder ... 
# 
if (ip.src == tcp.connSrc) 
{ 
# Splitting the contents of $line into command and argument components. 
# 
$parts= split($line); 
$first= elem($parts,0); 
# 
# Stored Intruder to Master password/command in variable $first 
# and comparing #first with pre-defined password and commands. 
# 
# In case of a match , the concerned command detection indicator 
# variable is set... 
# Also a variable $message is initialized for alert mechanism. 
if ( strcasecmp( $first, "sex" ) == 0 ) 
{ 
$warning = 1 ; 
$message= cat("Stream DDOS: Intruder-> Master password seen: ",$first); 
$pwd = l ; 
} 
else if ( strcasecmp( $first, "stream" ) == 0) 
{ 
$stream= 1; 
$second = elem($parts, 1 ); 
$third= elem($parts, 2) ; 
} 
# 
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else if (strcasecmp( $first, "quit" ) == 0) 
$quit= l; 
else if (strcasecmp( $first, "servers" ) == 0) 
$servers = 1 ; 
else if (strcasecmp( $first, "help" ) == 0) 
$help= l; 
else if (strcasecmp( $first, "who" ) == 0) 
$who= l; 
else if (strcasecmp( $first, "ping" ) == 0) 
$ping= I; 
else if ( strcasecmp( $first, "mstream" ) == 0) 
} #if 
{ 
$mstream = I; 
$second = elem($parts, I); 
$third = elem($parts, 2); 
} 
# If packet originated from the dest of TCP connection i.e. Master. .. 
# 
else if (ip.src == tcp.connDst) 
{ 
$response= cat($response, $line); 
# 
# Stored the contents of $line in variable $response for processing. 
# 
# Checking to see which intruder to master command was detected earlier. 
# Matching $response with appropriate response from command concerned ... 
# 
if( $pwd ==I) 
{ 
$pwd = O; 
$match = index ( $response, "Password accepted for connection from" ); 
if( $match!= -I) 
if ($stream== 1 ) 
{ 
{ 
$warning= I ; 
$message= cat ("Stream DDOS: Master-> Intruders. Additional Master 
on line."); 
$match! = index ( $response, "Usage: stream <hostname> <seconds>"); 
$match2 = index ( $response, "Unable to resolve"); 
$match3 = index ( $response, "Streaming" ); 
if ( ($match I != -1 ) II ($match2 != -1 ) II ($match3 != -1 )) 
{ 
$warning = I; 
$message= cat ("Stream DDOS: Intruder-> Master command: ", $first, 
" ",$second, " for ", $third, " seconds." ); 
$stream= O; 
} 
if ( $quit== 1 ) 
{ 
70 
$match= index ( $response, "has disconnected."); 
if( $match!= -1) 
if ( $servers "'"' 1 ) 
{ 
{ 
$warning = 1; 
$message = cat ("Stream DDOS: Intruder-> Master command seen: ", 
$first) ; 
$quit = 0; 
} 
$match!= index ( $response, "Server file doesn't exist, creating;"); 
$match2 = index ( $response, "The following ips are known servers:"); 
if ( ($match 1 != -1 ) II ($match2 != -1 ) ) 
if ( $help== I ) 
{ 
{ 
$warning "' 1; 
$message = cat ("Stream DDOS: Intruder-> Master command seen: ", 
$first ); 
$servers = 0; 
} 
$match"' index ( $response, "Available commands:"); 
if ( $match != -1 ) 
if( $who== I) 
{ 
{ 
$warning = 1; 
$message = cat ("Stream DDOS: Intruder-> Master command seen: ", 
$first); 
$help= O; 
} 
$match= index ( $response, "Socket number" ); 
if ( $match != -1 ) 
if ( $ping == 1 ) 
{ 
{ 
$warning = 1; 
$message= cat ("Stream DDOS: Intruder-> Master command seen: ", 
$first); 
$who = 0; 
} 
$match= index ( $response, "Pinging all servers."); 
if ( $match != - I ) 
{ 
$warning= 1; 
$message = cat ("Stream DDOS : Intruder-> Master command seen: ", 
$first ); 
$ping = O; 
} 
} #if 
} #filter 
if ( $mstream == 1 ) 
{ 
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$match! = index ( $response, "Usage: mstream <ipl :ip2:ip3 : ... > <seconds>" ); 
$match2 = index ( $response, "MStreaming" ); 
if ( ($match! != -I ) II ($match2 != -1)) 
{ 
$warning = 1; 
$message= cat ("Stream DDOS: Intruder-> Master command" , $first, 
"" , $second," for" , $third, " seconds."); 
$mstream = O; 
} 
if ( $warning== 1 ) 
{ 
} #while 
declare $start_time inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $src_ip inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $src_port inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $dst_ip inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $dst_port inside tcp.connSym; 
$start_time = system.time; 
$src_ip = tcp.connSrc; 
$src_port = tcp.connSport ; 
$dst_ip = tcp.connDst; 
$dst_port = tcp.connDport; 
# 
# recording required parameters .. . 
record system.time,$src_ip,$src_port,$dst_ip,$dst_port,$first to mstream_recorder; 
# 
# sending an alert message ... 
alert ( alert:MSTREAM, alert:SUSPICIOUS_ACTIVITY, $message); 
$warning= 0; 
} 
filter Master_Agent udp() 
{ 
# Filter for detecting communication between Master and Agent... 
# This filter is triggered on each arrival of a UDP packet. 
# 
# Further processing on UDP packet is carried out only if the packet 
# has the UDP destination port as 9325 or 7983. 
# These are the ports on which masters and agents communicate. 
# 
if ( (udp.dport == 9325) II (udp.dport == 7983) ) 
{ 
$contents= substr(udp.blob, 0, 4); 
# 
# Stored the first 4 bytes of udp packet in variable $contents 
} #filter 
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# for comparison with command and response strings between 
# masters and agents ... 
# 
if ( (strcasecmp($contents, "ping") == 0) II (strcasecmp($contents, "pong") == 0) ) 
{ 
$warning = 1; 
$message= cat("Stream DDOS: Master<-> Agent Comm seen: ",$contents); 
} 
else if ( (strcasecmp( substr(udp.blob, 0, 6), "stream")== 0) II 
(strcasecmp( substr(udp.blob, 0, 7), "mstream") == 0) ) 
{ 
$al = index(udp.blob, "/"); 
$cmd = substr(udp.blob, 0, $al); 
$sub= substr(udp.blob, ($al+ 1 )); 
$a2 = index($sub, "/"); 
$target_ip = substr($sub, 0, $a2); 
$contents= cat($cmd," ",$target_ip); 
$warning = 1 ; 
$message= cat("Stream DDOS: Master<-> Agent Cmd: ", $cmd, ", to attack", 
$target_ip); 
else if (strcasecmp( substr(udp.blob, 0, 9), "newserver") == 0) 
{ 
$contents= substr(udp.blob, 0, 9); 
$warning= 1; 
$message= cat("Stream DDOS: Master<-> Agent Comm seen: ",$contents); 
} 
if ($warning== I ) 
{ 
} #if 
$start_time = system.time; 
$src_ip = ip.src; 
$src_port = udp.sport; 
$dst_ip = ip.dst; 
$dst_port = udp.dport ; 
record system.time,$src_ip,$src_port,$dst_ip,$dst_port,$contents to mstream_recorder; 
alert ( alert:MSTREAM, alert:SUSPICIOUS_ACTIVITY, $message); 
$warning= O; 
} 
# Initializing a global variable "count" for keeping track of the 
# nubber of attack packets seen on the net... 
count= 0; 
echo("count = ",count,"\n"); 
filter Attack_packets ip(proto: 6) 
{ 
73 
# Filter for detecting attack packets directed from Agents to Targets .. . 
# 
# This filter is triggered on each arrival of an IP packet having 
# protocol type as 6 i.e. TCP. 
# Further processing is carried out only if the packet src ip address 
# does not match your network address. This is because the attack 
# packets have spoofed src IP addresses ... 
# 
$ip_addr = ""; 
$ip_addr = cat($ip_addr,ip.src); 
$addr_parts = split($ip_addr, "."); 
$first_part = elem($addr_parts,O) ; 
$second_part = elem($addr_parts,l) ; 
$third_part = elem($addr_parts,2); 
if ( (strcasecmp( $first_part, "129") != 0) II (strcasecmp( $second_part, "186") != 0)) 
{ 
} #filter 
# 
# Get the value of ACK flag ... 
$flags= (ubyte(ip.blob, 13) » 4); 
$ack = ($flags & l); 
# 
# get the value of Ack Number field .. . 
$ackl = ubyte(ip.blob, 8); 
$ackl = $ackl << 24; 
$ack2 = ubyte(ip.blob, 9); 
$ack2 = $ack2 << I 6; 
$ack3 = ubyte(ip.blob, IO); 
$ack3 = $ack3 « 8; 
$ack4 = ubyte(ip.blob, 11 ); 
$ack_number = $ackl I $ack2 I $ack3 I $ack4; 
# 
# get the value of Header Window Size ... 
$msb = ubyte(ip.blob, 14); 
$lsb = ubyte(ip.blob , 15); 
$msb = $msb << 8; 
$header_wind = $msb I $lsb; 
# 
# Attack packets have the signatures ... 
if ( ($ack == 1) && ($ack_number == 0) && ($header_wind == 16384)) 
{ 
# echo ("Attack Packet 2.\n"); 
} #if 
count = count + 1; 
} #if 
filter Send_Alert timeout( sec: 2, repeat) 
{ 
# Filter for determining when sufficient attack packets have been 
# seen on the net... 
# 
# This filter is triggered after every 2 seconds and sends an alert 
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# if the number of attack packets received in this time is more 
# than 50 ... 
# 
if ( count >= 50 ) 
{ 
} #filter 
$message= cat("Stream DDOS: Attack Packets on the net."); 
alert ( alert:MSTREAM, alert:SUSPICIOUS_ACTIVITY, $message); 
count= O; 
} #if 
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APPENDIX B: NFR FILTER FOR BUFFER OVERFLOW ATTACK 
AGAINST SMTP IMPLEMENTATIONS 
# BUFFER OVERFLOW DETECTOR FOR SMTP TRANSACTIONS 
# 
# This filter has been designed to detect and monitor traffic 
# between a client and a server SMTP in order to detect an 
# ongoing buffer overflow attack. 
# 
# Our schema 
smtp_bof_schema=library _schema:new( I ,["time", "i p" , "int" , "ip" , "int" , "string" , "string", "string"] ,scope()); 
# Our recorder 
smtp_bof_recorder=recorder("bi n/list packages/smtp/smtp _bof. cf g", "smtp _bof_schema ") ; 
filter smtp_bof tcp ( client, dport: 25 ) 
{ 
# The filter is triggered on each arrival of a TCP packet 
# that originates from a client SMTP and is destined for 
# a server SMTP at port 25. 
declare $blob inside tcp.connSym; 
# $blob is a local variable that holds and accumulates 
# the contents of TCP packets as they arrive. 
if ($blob == null) 
$blob= tcp.blob; 
else 
$blob= cat ( $blob, tcp.blob ); 
declare $state inside tcp.connSym; 
# 
# $state is a variable that will be set on receipt of SMTP command DATA. 
# The data received from this command onwards till receipt of a packet having only "." 
# doesn't belong to a command packet, so needs to be ignored. After receiving" .", $state 
# will be reset so that the filter again starts recognizing SMTP commands. 
# The while loop extracts one line each from the $blob and processes it 
# to check for appropriate length of each SMTP command contents. 
# 
while (I == I) 
{ 
# Find the end of the first line by checking for presence of "\n ". 
# If not present, it means the whole packet contains a 
# line which may continue even in the next packet. 
$x = index( $blob, "\n" ); 
if ($x < 0) 
break; 
# Some sendmails send "command\n" and some send "command\r\n" 
# Check the syntax and break the string up appropriately. 
$y = substr($blob,$x- l, I); 
if ($y == '\r') 
$line= substr($blob,0,$x-l ); 
else 
$line= substr($blob,0,$x); 
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# Stored the first line into "$line" for further processing. 
# $line has the "\r\n" or the "\n" only, removed from the end. 
# This portion analyzes the lines of the SMTP transaction carrying the SMTP 
# commands. Each line is checked for the approximate allowed lenght and then discarded 
# Remove leading whitespace if any. 
$z = subs tr ($line, 0, 1 ); 
while ( ($z == " ") II ($z == "\t")) 
{ 
$line= substr($line, 1 ); 
$z = substr($line,0,l); 
} 
# Remove trailing white spaces if any. 
$In= strlen ($line); 
$zz = substr ($line, $In-I, I); 
while (($zz == " ") II ($zz == "\t")) 
{ 
$line= substr ($line, 0, $In-I); 
$In= strlen ($line); 
$zz = substr ($line, $in-], I) ; 
} 
# Ignoring data received after DATA command that doesn't belong 
# to any SMTP command packet. 
if ( $state== 1 ) 
# 
{ 
# No action on data received after DATA command, as it doesn't belong 
# to any SMTP command packet. 
# 
# $state is reset after receiving end of mail message indicator"." 
if ( strcasecmp($line, ".") == 0) 
$state= 0; 
# If data received belongs to an SMTP command packet... 
else 
# RFC82 l defines the commands as being exactly 4 characters. 
# get the commands and process the appropriate case. 
declare $warning inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $vul_cmd inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $length inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $arg inside tcp.connSym; 
$warning = 0; 
$vul_cmd = "" ; 
$length = ""; 
$shellcode = 0; 
$nops = 0; 
77 
$cmd = substr($line, 0, 4); 
if ( (strcasecmp( $crud, "DATA")== 0) II (strcasecmp( $crud, "QUIT")== 0) II 
(strcasecmp( $crud, "RSET" ) == 0) II (strcasecmp( $crud, "NOOP" ) == 0) II 
(strcasecmp( $crud, "TURN" ) == 0) ) 
{ 
$!en= strlen ($line); 
if ($!en> 4) 
else 
{ 
$arg = substr ($line, 4); 
# Remove leading whitespace if any. 
$a= subs tr ($arg, 0, I); 
while (($a== " ") II ($a== "\t")) 
{ 
$arg = substr($arg, I); 
$a= substr($arg,0,I); 
} 
$warning= I; 
$vul_cmd = cat ($vul_cmd, $cmd); 
$!en = strlen ($arg); 
$length = cat ($length, $Jen); 
} 
$length= ""; 
$arg = '"' ; 
} 
# After receiving DATA command, $state needs to be set so that this filter 
# ignores the data received from this point onwards till a packet having 
#only"." which marks the end of mail message. 
if(strcasecmp( $crud, "DATA")== 0) 
$state= I; 
else if ( (strcasecmp($cmd, "HELO")== 0) II (strcasecmp($cmd, "EHLO")== 0) ) 
{ 
$xx= index ($line,":"); 
$arg = subs tr ($line, $xx+ I); 
# Remove leading whitespace if any. 
$a= substr ($arg, 0, !); 
while ( ($a == " ") II ($a == "\t")) 
{ 
$arg = substr($arg, I); 
$a= substr($arg,0,l ); 
} 
$!en = strlen ($arg); 
if( $!en> 85) 
{ 
$warning= l; 
$vul_cmd = cat ($vul_cmd, $cmd); 
$length = cat ($length, $!en); 
} 
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else if ( (strcasecmp( $cmd, "MAIL" ) == 0) II (strcasecmp( $cmd, "SEND" ) == 0) II 
(strcasecmp( $cmd, "SOML") == 0) II (strcasecmp( $cmd, "SAML") == 0) II 
(strcasecmp( $cmd, "RCPT" ) == 0) II (strcasecmp( $cmd, "VRFY" ) == 0) ) 
{ 
$xx= index ($line,":"); 
$arg = substr ($line, $xx+ 1); 
# Remove leading whitespace if any. 
$a= substr ($arg, 0, !); 
while (($a== " ") II ($a== "\t")) 
{ 
$arg = substr($arg, I) ; 
$a = substr($arg,0, I) ; 
} 
$!en = strlen ($arg); 
if ( $Jen > 150 ) 
{ 
$warning= I ; 
$vul_cmd = cat ($vul_cmd, $cmd); 
$length = cat ($length, $Jen); 
} 
else if ( strcasecmp( $cmd, "EXPN" ) == 0) 
{ 
$arg = substr ($line, 4); 
# Remove leading whitespace if any. 
$a= substr ($arg, 0, 1); 
while (($a==" ") II ($a== "\t")) 
{ 
$arg = substr($arg, I ); 
$a= substr($arg,0, I); 
} 
$Jen = strlen ($arg); 
if ( $Jen > 85 ) 
{ 
$warning = I ; 
$vul_cmd = "EXPN"; 
$length = cat ($length, $Jen); 
} 
else if ( strcasecmp( $cmd, "HELP" ) == 0) 
{ 
$arg = substr ($line, 4); 
# Remove leading whitespace if any. 
$a= subs tr ($arg, 0, I); 
while (($a== " ") II ($a== "\t")) 
{ 
$arg = substr($arg, 1 ); 
$a= substr($arg,0,l); 
} 
$Jen = strlen ($arg); 
if ( $Jen > 10 ) 
{ 
$warning= I ; 
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$vul_cmd = "HELP"; 
$length= cat ($length, $Jen); 
} 
# A packet of suspicious length has been observed. So record the 
# required parameters from the packet and generate an alert ... 
if ( $warning == I ) 
{ 
# So the length of argument is more than that expected. 
# It may be an attack packet. 
# Check for presence of string "/bin/sh" in this packet which 
# will verify presenceof buffer overflow attack code. 
if ( (index($arg, "/bin/sh"))>= 0) 
$shellcode = I; 
# Formulating alert message to be displayed in NFR GUI according to 
# type of threat observed in the argument to SMTP command packets. 
if ( $shellcode == I ) 
$message= cat ("SMTP Cmd Pkt of suspicious length: ", $Jen, 
else 
" from: ", $src_ip, "(", $src_port, ") ->", 
$dst_ip, "(" , $dst_port, ") with string /bin/sh") ; 
$message= cat ("SMTP Cmd Pkt of suspicious length: ", $Jen, 
" from: ", $src_ip, "(", $src_port, ") ->", 
$dst_ip, "(" , $dst_port, ")"); 
declare $start_time inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $src_ip inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $src_port inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $dst_ip inside tcp.connSym; 
declare $dst_port inside tcp.connSym; 
$start_time = system.time; 
$src_ip = tcp.connSrc; 
$src_port = tcp.connSport; 
$dst_ip = tcp.connDst; 
$dst_port = tcp.connDport ; 
record system.time,$src_ip,$src_port,$dst_ip,$dst_port,$vul_cmd,$1ength,$arg to 
smtp_bof_recorder; 
alert ( alert:SMTP _BOF, alert:SUSPICIOUS_ACTIVITY, $message); 
$warning = O; 
$shellcode = 0; 
$nops = 0; 
} 
# Remove the line from the blob that we have 
# recently processed. 
$blob= substr($blob , $x + !); 
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} # while loop ends. 
# If we did not get "\n" in this packet we did not see the end of line 
# in this packet and it may be there in the next one. 
if (strlen($blob) > 2048) 
$blob= "~" ; 
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APPENDIX C: ALERT/QUERY SYSTEM OUTPUT DDOS FILTER 
25-Oct-00 12 13:50 PM idl .issl.iostote.edu 
25-Oct-O0 12 13:50 PM 1dl .issl.iosto te.edu 
25-Oct-O0 12.14:36 PM idl .issl.iostote.edl.l 
25-Oct-00 12·14:56 PM idl .issl.iostote .edu 
25-Oct-00 12 1 4:56 PM 1d1 .issl.iostote .edu mstreem 
25-Dct-00 12 15:09 PM idl .issl.iastote .edu mstreem 
25-Oct-00 12:15:09 PM idl .issl.iastote .edu 
25-Oct--00 12 15:09 PM idl .issl iostote.edu mstrel"lm 
25-Oct-00 12 15:09 PM idl .issl iostote.edu 
25-Oct-O0 12 15:09 PM idl .1ssl.iostote .edu mstreom 
25-Oct--00 12.17:16 PM idl .issl.iosto.te.edu mstreom 
25-Oct-00 12 l 7:16 PM idl .issl.iostote .edu ms!reom 
25-0ct-00 1218:03 PM idl issL,ostote edu mstreom 
25-Oct--O0 12.18:03 PM 1dl .issl.iostote.edu 
25-Oct-00 12:18:0 7 PM idl .issl.iostote.edu mstreom 
25-Oct-00 12-19:05 PM 1dl .iss l.1 ostate.edu mstree.m 
25-0ct-O0 1219:05 PM 1dl .issl.iaslate.edu mstream 
25-Oct-00 12:19:28 PM idl .iss l.iastate.edu mstreom 
25-Oct-00 12·19:36 PM idl .iss l iostote.edu mstreo.m 
25-OcHI0 12 19:36 PM idl .issUostote.edu mstreom 
25-Oct-00 1219:44 PM id l .issl.iostote.edu mstreom 
25-Oct-00 12:19:59 PM idl .issl.iosto.te.edu mstreo.m 
25-Oc.1-00 12 19:59 PM idl issl.io.slo.te edu mstreo.m 
25-Oct-00 12 19·59 PM 1dl .issl.iostote.e du mstreom 
Intruder-> Master possword see n; sex 
lnln.t der -> Master command seen who 
lnlruder -> Master command seen servers 
lnlrude r -> Moster commend seen ping 
Moster<-> Agent Comm seen: ping 
M aster<-> Agent Comm seen ping 
Master<-> Agent Comm seen pong 
Moster<-> Agent Comm seen : pong 
Moster<-> Agent Comm seen: newseNer 
Mo.Ster <-> Agent Comm seen newseNer 
Intruder-> Master password seen· sex 
Intruder-> Moste, command see n ping 
Intruder-> Mo..ster commond seen seNers 
Moster<-> Agent Comm seen. newseNer 
Moster<-> Agent Comm seen newseNer 
Intruder-> Moster password seen: sex 
Intrude,-> Moster command seen help 
Intruder-> Moster command seen who 
Intruder-> Moste r commend seen seNers 
Intruder-> Moste r commond seen ping 
Moster<-> Agent Comm seen· ping 
Master<-> Agent Comm seen pong 
mstreom 
mstreom 
mstreom 
Intruder-> Moster commond seen mstream 129.186.215.209 129.186.215.206 for 1 seconds 
Moster <-> Agent Cmd seen: mstreorn. to ottock 129.186.215.209:129.186.215.206 
Msheom Ario.ck Pockets on the net 
~ .slr_e .~1!1 ~o.ck P~ckets on t~e .net 
129. IU.215.202 ·e"'33 ·129186215.213 
~129.116.llS 213 -ll-•-2----,1_2~ 1 ..~.~ 215 210 
:'i'i9:-i-&6jff'i'i'c1 .. ··············:frOi".. f2,i.fl~-21·i213 
l 29 IM .215 .202 
i 2§."i'!fi"i"'firii 
r1 ·2f·i·ii.-:Z"i"i.if3 
!129.116.215 210 
,------fi)?.J~-r~jr~:~r:··· 
\J29. 1!62IS.202 
;e•33 ·12, 186.2 15213 
:7••~,~,----'i"it··i·S6.211213 
;i"i•i·· li9.11iiiliifrj·-· 
:3503 129 186.215 213 
···· ·:·r?.t~:::: ·· ················· ··· 129.116.1.200 
1•36 "i'29'la6.ii·s"-J13 
~~~~~ ----··_· . ::::~::::::::!Iif-:~-~~-·_· ---:::~:----· ·_·-- -: ~:~ ::~;!·:~:: .. !~:. 
,IOX 
help 
6723 ..... ) Pio.I 
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APPENDIX D: ALERT/QUERY SYSTEM OUTPUT BOF FILTER 
idl.is!i-Ucu;.to.ta edu nfrd 
idl .issl.iost6\a.edu nfrd 
idl .issl.iosto.ta.edu nfrd 
idl .issl.io.s101e.edu nfrd 
26-0cHJO 12:3513 AM 1dl .,ssl .iosto.1e.edu 
26--0cKl0 12:3513 AM 1dl .1ssl.ieiosta1e .edu 
26-Oct-00 12:3513 AM 1dl .1ssl .iosto1e .edu 
26-Oct--00 12:35·1 JAM 1dl .ISSl.io.sto.te .edu 
26--0ct-OO 12·JS·1JAM 1dl.1ssl.io.ste.te.edu 
26-Oct-00 12·Js·13 AM 1dl IS Sl.iostole.edu 
26-Oc:t--00 12:JS·t JAM 1dl .,ssl 10s tole .edu 
26-Oci-O0 12:35 13 AM 1dl ,sst iosto!e.edu 
26-0ct-OO 12:35 13 AM ,dl ,ssl iostoie.edu 
26-0ct-00 12·35 13 AM ,dl ,sst.iostole edu 
26-0ci-OO 1 2 35:16 AM ,dl .iul.,o.stote edu 
26-0ct--00 12:35 53 AM ,ctl .,ul iosto1e.edu 
26-0ct-O0 12:38 37 AM ,dl .1ssd.io.state.1tdu 
26-Oct-00 12:3919 AM 1dl 1ssl io.stote.edu 
26-Oci-O0 12:39 40 AM ,ct t .,ssl iosto1e.edu 
26-0ct--00 12·40 OOAM 1dl .,ssl 1oslot.,.edu 
26-0ct--00 12:40 22 AM ,dl .,ss l.iostate .edu 
26-0ct-OO 12:41.JOAM ,dl .,ssl .iostate.edu 
26·0ct-OO 12:42.15AM idl .issl.ias1ate.edu 
26-0ct-OO 12.42.39AM ,dl .issl.iastate.edu 
26-0ct-OO 12:43.01 AM 1dl .issl.iastate.edu 
26-0ct--00 12:43.21 AM idl .issl.iastate.edu 
26-0ct--00 12:43.26 AM 
26-0ct-OO 12:43 ·•11 AM 
nfrd 
nfrd 
nfrd 
otrd 
0trd 
Otrd 
otrd 
nfrd 
nfrd 
nfrd 
-bd 
SMTP_BOF 
SMTP_BOF 
nlrd startup $Header: /home/me.ster/nfrbas9/nfr/nlrd/ntrd.c.v 1.54 1998/12/01 14:16:25 mls Exp$: bin/nfrd 
nfrd: o;;1;1n1ig file path: /homw/nfr/etc/nfrd.cfg 
xl0: (2) 
New i11ter1oce added: nfrd.dg: x!O 
user a-edentiols set to. 1002 
nfrd Commend Filo Sue~~ / etc/run/nfrd.fifo 
New component loeided: etc/ve,lues.veilues 
Ne-,,,, componentloeided llbre,,y/hbre,,y/exc:ept.nlr 
Nsw romponent loeided. lrbre,,y/hbre,,y/hnepro10.nfr 
New component loaded· hbre,,y/hbro,y/schama nfr 
New component loaded· pad<.e.ges/ddos.nfr 
attempting to start recorder bin/list scheme. mstreom_s chema. from t,le : packages/ddos/mstream nlr:15 
New component loaded· pod<.ages/ddos/mstreom.nfr 
New componen1 loaded· pockoges/smtp.nfr 
o.tlempting to ~to.rt recorder bon/hst schem a smtp_bol_scheme. from tile: po.cko.ges/smtp/sm1p_bol.ntrl 4 
New component loaded. po.ck.o.ges/smtp/smtp_bol.nfr 
-bd slo.rted. listening on 0.0.0.0 to port 2001 
SMTP Cmd _ helo. of susp,cious length : 101 from : 129.186.215.210(3109) ->129.186 51 (25)w,th strong /bin/sh 
SMTP Cmd _mo.i i. of suspicious length 155 !rom : 129 186 215.210(3110) ·>129.186.5.1(25) with string /bin/sh 
SMTP Cmd 1cpt of s uspicious length - 155 from : 129.186.215 .210(3111)->129.186.51 (25) wi1h stnng /bin/sh 
SMTP Cmd sli!nd. of susp,c,ous lsngth: 155 from : 129.186.215.210(3112) ->129. 186.5.1 (25) with string /bin/sh 
SMTP Cmd somL of s uspoaous 1.,ngth 155 trom 129.186.215.210{3113)->129186.5.1 (25) with string /bin/sh 
SMTP Cmd so.ml ot s usp,c,ous l9ngth 155 from 129.186.215.210(3114)->129186.51 (25) with string /bin/sh 
SMTP Cmd . EX?N .. of sus p,cious IEingth . 97 from 129.186.215.210(311 S)->129186 .5.1(25) with string /bin/sh 
SMTP Cmd . HELP. of s uspicious length 25 from . 129.186.215.21 O(J116)->129 .186.5.1(25)with string /bin/sh 
SMTP Cmd . de.to, of s uspic,ous length . 25 from : 129.186.215.210(3117)->129.186.5.1 (25) with string /bin/sh 
SMTP Cmd : rset of suspicious length. 25 from . 129.186.215.210(3118)->129.186.5.1 (25) with string /bin/sh 
SMTP Cmd : noop. of suspicious l9nglh : 25 from : 129.186.215.210(3119) ->129.186.5.1(25) with string /bin/sh 
SMTP Cmd : tum .. ol susp ,cious length : 25 from 129.186.215.210(31 20) ->129.186.5.1(25) with string /bm/sh 
SMTP Cmd . quil of suspicious length : 25 1rom 129.186.215.210(3121 ) ·>129.1 · 
' ••loadj ~ " ,, 
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bbi.i,o_~t -~-~ -o~:J.~}.I ...?.~.O.~... 129. 186.215 210 :J101 129. 116 5. 1 2s . -~ -1~ .. 
Thu0ct2600:J5:5J2000 l29.lld.21S.210 jJ IO, 12911651 25 helo 
JOO 
.. IOI 
-[ IOI 
!JOI 
!'J?u Oct 26_. o~_:,~1.:~? . .?~~.0 ------------------·--· ' in11~·_ii-s- fio" .. __ -·-··· '"ii" iO 129 116 5. 1 ·········-··· ·- ·····-· - ... 25 mlll 
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